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COMMENTS
TITLE IX LEAVES SOME ATHLETES ASKING,
"CAN WE PLAY TOO?"
Title IX (Title IX or the Act), enacted as part of the Educational
Amendments of 1972,1 prohibits discrimination in any federally funded
education program or activity.2 While striving toward a noble goal, Title
IX has been slow to eliminate the discrimination it was designed to rem-
edy.3 Although little legislative material accompanied the Act's passage,4
it soon became apparent that athletics fell within Title IX's purview.
5
In the years following Title IX's enactment, its sparse legislative history
made it unclear whether the Act applied specifically to university athletic
programs.6 This ambiguity caused concern in the university community
1. Title IX of the Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Stat. 235,
373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988)).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The section states: "No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance .... Id.
3. Alexander Wolff, The Slow Track, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1992, at 52
(stating that many universities are ignoring Title IX's requirements); Laura Duncan, Col-
leges Slowly Leveling Playing Field For Women, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 5, 1994, at 1
(citing a recent poll that found only one of 646 colleges surveyed were even close to com-
plying with the Act); see Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty-Year Retrospec-
tive on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 2 (1992) (calling Title IX the
"cornerstone of federal statutory protection for female athletes").
4. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress
included no committee report with the final bill, and athletics was mentioned only twice
during the congressional debate); Catherine Pieronek, A Clash of Titans: College Football
v. Title IX, 20 J.C. & U.L. 351, 353 (1994) (discussing Title IX's legislative history); see
infra notes 34-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Act's legislative history).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (granting each federal department and agency the authority to
effectuate the provisions of § 1681 by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general appli-
cability consistent with the objectives of the Act); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric.,
998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.) (noting that the Act delegated to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) the responsibility for promulgating regulations that include
college athletics), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 (explaining
that the Secretary of HEW followed the directive of Congress by promulgating regulations
which specifically included college athletics); see infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text
(discussing Title IX's regulations).
6. Joseph E. Krakora, Note, The Application of Title IX to School Athletic Programs,
68 CORNELL L. REv. 222, 223 (1983) (stating that after its enactment, considerable conflict
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because college athletics had become and still are such an integral part of
American society.7 In 1975, at the behest of Congress,8 the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued regulations that ex-
tended Title IX's scope to include intercollegiate athletics.' But it was
not until 1979, when HEW published a Policy Interpretation, ° that Title
IX's effect on university athletic programs became clear." Just after
existed over the Act's applicability to college athletics); see infra notes 36-38 and accompa-
nying text (elaborating on Title IX's legislative history).
7. James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND.
L.J. 9, 9-10 (1985-86) (noting that sports occupy a unique and sometimes overriding posi-
tion in America, and stating that athletics in the United States are "larger than life" both
economically and socially); see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 891. The court comments that college
athletics occupy a prominent role in America. Id. It not only offers college scholarships to
athletes, but college athletics also teaches valuable lessons both on and off the field in areas
of leadership and self confidence. Id. See Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and
Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 34 (quoting Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of
HEW, who stated: "I had not realized until the [Act's] comment period that athletics is the
single most important thing in the United States"); Philip Anderson, A Football School's
Guide To Title IX Compliance, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 75, 76 (1995) (commenting on the impor-
tance of intercollegiate athletics to the American education system); Melissa M. Beck,
Note, Fairness on the Field- Amending Title VII to Foster Greater Female Participation in
Professional Sports, 12 CARUOzO ARTS & Er. L.J. 241 (1994) (stating that in American
culture, sports are synonymous with apple pie and the Fourth of July); Jill Johnson, Note,
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of the Standards for
Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553 (1994) (noting that athletics are an integral part of Amer-
ican universities); Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PENN L.
REV. 1474 (1975) (exemplifying the importance of baseball in American society by com-
paring the origins of a rule of the national pastime with the origins of the English and
American systems of jurisprudence). But cf Koch, supra, at 9-10 (noting that while sports
do hold a prominent position in our minds, they are not as big as we might suppose). The
author points out that the University of Michigan's athletic budget is only the economic
equivalent of one prosperous central Indiana supermarket. Id. at 10.
8. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893-94 (commenting on the various layers of Title IX regula-
tions); Anderson, supra note 7, at 79 n.21 (noting that Congress charged HEW with
promulgating Title IX regulations).
9. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, General Administration, 40 Fed.
Reg. 24,128 (1975) (bringing each educational program or activity which receives or bene-
fits from federal financial assistance, including athletics, under the guise of Title IX); 45
C.F.R. § 86.4 (1994) (requiring "whatever remedial action is necessary ... to eliminate
existing discrimination on the basis of sex"); Krakora, supra note 6, at 222 (noting that
HEW interpreted the statute as "extending to athletic programs in any institution receiving
federal money" regardless of whether or not the money actually is used in the athletic
program).
10. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Office of Civil Rights, Office of the
Secretary, HEW 1979) [hereinafter Policy Interpretation] (outlining HEW's interpretation
of Title IX's regulations).
11. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979) (discussing the
enactment history of Title IX). But see Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563-70
(1984) (finding that Title IX coverage of athletics is not triggered when students receive
Federal Basic Educational Opportunity Grants to pay for their education).
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HEW published the Policy Interpretation, Congress divided HEW into
two agencies, 12 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)' 3
and the Department of Education (DED). 14 The latter took over admin-
istration of Title IX.15
Following the issuance of the regulations and subsequent Policy Inter-
pretation, it became obvious that Title IX was applicable to universities
on an institution-wide basis.' 6 This institution-wide approach meant that
if any portion of an institution received federal funding, then all of the
programs within that institution were subject to Title IX.17 This broad
reading of the Act, applying an institution-wide approach, was not popu-
lar with either university athletic administrators or the National Col-
12. See 20 U.S.C. § 3411-3510 (1988).
13. Id. § 3508 (changing the name of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare to the Department of Health and Human Services); see Johnson, supra note 7, at 554-
55 n.11 (explaining the confusion surrounding the split of HEW and the subsequent assign-
ment of Title IX to DED); Anderson, supra note 7, at 79 n.21.
14. See 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(1) (transferring all of the education functions of HEW to
DED).
15. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 n.3 (10th Cir.)
(noting that DED's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is now in charge of administering Title
IX), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir.
1993). The First Circuit, commenting on what it called "a wonderful example of bureau-
cratic muddle," explained that in 1979 Congress split HEW into the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Education. Id. At the time of the
split, Title IX's regulations were left with HHS, but DED promulgated its own substan-
tially similar set of regulations. Id. Because both sets of regulations are still in effect and
are essentially identical, this Comment refers to both sets as interchangeable.
16. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1994). The regulations define recipient as:
[A]ny State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State or
political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organiza-
tion, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is ex-
tended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education
program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance, including any
subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.
Id.; see Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (1979). The Policy Interpretation,
in adopting the institution-wide approach, states that "[tihis Policy Interpretation applies
to any public or private institution, person or other entity that operates an educational
program or activity which receives or benefits from financial assistance authorized or ex-
tended under a law administered by the Department." Id.
17. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing the institution-wide ap-
proach to Title IX).
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legiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 18 who now were forced to bring
college athletics into compliance with Title IX.19
Title IX, in conjunction with a number of related events, spurred the
growth of women's sports in this country in the 1970s and early 1980s.20
But in 1984, the Supreme Court examined and disagreed with the institu-
tion-wide approach of Title IX in Grove City College v. Bell.2' The Court
reversed the institution-wide approach by ruling that Congress intended
the Act to be enforced at universities in a program-specific manner.22 In
light of this decision, Title IX lost nearly all of the effectiveness it previ-
ously had gained in remedying discrimination in college athletic pro-
grams.23 Congress responded to the Grove City College decision, by
passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, (Restoration Act),2 4
which re-adopted the institution-wide approach of Title IX25 and brought
university athletics back within the scope of Title IX.26
Since the passage of the Restoration Act, Title IX has become a focal
point at many universities, particularly in light of the budget restraints
that many schools currently face.27 Title IX has prompted both female
and male members of eliminated athletic teams to file suit alleging Title
18. The NCAA, a voluntary association of over 800 colleges and universities, was
formed in 1906 at the behest of President Theodore Roosevelt. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY
R. ROBERTS, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON SPORTS AND THE LAW 496-97 (1993).
The NCAA was created as a forum for reshaping the rules of football, but has since
evolved into a governing body for all intercollegiate athletics. Id. at 497.
19. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 561 n.51 (noting the expensive legal battle that was
fought by the NCAA to keep HEW from promulgating regulations).
20. P. Michael Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Revitalization of
Title IX, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149, 150 (1990) (discussing the growth of women's athletics
in the 1970s and early 1980s).
21. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
22. See id. at 570-71 (adopting the program-specific approach); see also infra notes 86-
104 and accompanying text (discussing the Grove City College decision).
23. See Villalobos, supra note 20, at 151 (commenting that the Supreme Court left
women's athletics with no substantive protection, and several schools immediately elimi-
nated women's programs).
24. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988)).
25. § 3(a), 102 Stat. at 28-29; see infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text (discussing
the Restoration Act).
26. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.) (noting
that since 1988 Title IX has applied to all of the operations of a recipient of federal fund-
ing), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
27. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1993). The university
cited budget concerns as the primary reason for its elimination of the athletic team. Id.;
Andrew Blum, Athletics in the Court: New Wave of Title IX School Bias Suits Hit, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1, 30 (stating that "belt-tightening on some college campuses has
sparked a new round of Title IX litigation").
[Vol. 44:841
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IX and other constitutional violations. 28 In response, courts have devel-
oped an analytic framework for Title IX cases29 based on a thorough
reading of both the regulations and the Policy Interpretation.3" This anal-
ysis yields positive results for female teams, 31 negative results for male
teams,32 and difficult choices for university administrators.33
This Comment focuses primarily on Title IX's applicability to, and ef-
fect on, university athletic programs. This Comment begins by analyzing
Title IX's history, from its passage in 1972 through the Restoration Act of
1987. Next, this Comment focuses on plaintiffs who have brought suit
against universities because the school eliminated their team from its ath-
letic program. Through a review of these cases, this Comment analyzes
the framework courts use to decide whether a university is complying
with Title IX. This Comment then addresses the flaws in the present
analysis and argues that the present Title IX analysis represents an impos-
sible situation for universities and an unfortunate situation for male
teams. This Comment concludes by recommending alternatives to the
present Title IX analysis that allow university administrators to reach eq-
uitable decisions for both female and male athletes, while the school re-
tains its decision making freedom.
28. See infra notes 118-88 (discussing at length, cases in which female teams and male
teams have brought suit under Title IX). For a variety of cases claiming federal and state
equal protection violations, see Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp.
237, 242-43 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting the men's team's Equal Protection claim), aff'd 35
F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678
F. Supp. 517, 524-36 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (permitting the plaintiff to include an Equal Protec-
tion claim with their Title IX claim); Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1382-
83 (Wash. 1987) (examining a claim brought under the State Equal Rights Amendment).
This Comment will focus on the Title IX claims made in these cases.
29. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 824, 827-33 (applying the statutory and regulatory frame-
work for Title IX cases); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,894-96 (1st Cir. 1993) (laying
out the framework in further detail); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584
(W.D. Pa. 1993) (showing the analysis applied in Title IX cases).
30. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
31. See infra notes 118-70 (discussing the recent cases brought by women).
32. See Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 996 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (deciding that
Drake University had not violated Title IX by eliminating the men's wrestling team); Kel-
ley, 832 F. Supp. at 243-44 (recognizing the men's swimming team as an innocent victim of
Title IX's "benevolent attempt to remedy the effects of an historical deemphasis on athletic
opportunities for women").
33. Blum, supra note 27, at 30-31 (pointing to some of the difficulties that Title IX
compliance is presenting).
1995]
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I. TITLE IX's HISTORY
A. Ambiguous Language and Legislative Interpretations
Section 1681(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197214
provides that no person shall be discriminated against or excluded from
participation in any educational program or activity that receives federal
financial aid.35 As originally enacted, Title IX contained broad language
but very little legislative history to clarify its scope.36 This ambiguity con-
cerned university administrators as they attempted to determine which
school programs were subject to the Act.37 Much of the initial concern
centered around vague terminology used to define what programs the
Act applied to, including the broad phrase "any education program or
activity."' 38 Because of this ambiguity, two schools of thought developed
concerning who or what constituted a recipient under the Act - the pro-
gram-specific and the institution-wide approach.39
The program-specific approach to Title IX, favored by athletic adminis-
trators and initially by the NCAA,4 ° defines a recipient as any university
34. Title IX of the Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Stat. 235,
373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988)).
35. Section 1681(a) states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
36. See Krakora, supra note 6, at 223 (noting that the pre-enactment history does not
address Title IX's scope); Claudia S. Lewis, Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amend-
ments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language With Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 ForDn-
HAM L. REv. 1043, 1049-50 (1983) (commenting on Title IX's broad language).
37. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that most of
the anxiety centered around the football team because the men's football budget far ex-
ceeded that of any other sport); Krakora, supra note 6, at 223 (discussing whether the Act
should apply to an entire school or just particular programs within the school); Lewis,
supra note 36, at 1050 (stating that the language of the Act should be read broadly).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. The statute states that discrimination is prohibited "under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. § 1681(a); see
Krakora, supra note 6, at 223 n.10 (reviewing the debate between two senators as to the
proper meaning of the phrase "'any program or activity' ").
39. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 1050-55 (concluding that the smattering of legislative
history under Title IX shows that Congress favored the adoption of the institution-wide
approach). But see Janet Lammersen Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside
HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 62 (1976) (arguing that Title IX's language must be
construed narrowly and therefore should not apply to college athletics).
40. See James V. Koch, Title IX and the NCAA, 3 W. ST. L. REv. 250, 256 (1976)
(discussing the NCAA's initial position advocating the program-specific approach); Ander-
son, supra note 7, at 97 (discussing the NCAA's position on exemptions for revenue pro-
ducing sports under Title IX). But cf Ivan Maisel, Engendering Fear; Equity Issue of
Sports Spending Cuts to College Football's Core, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5,1993, at
1B, 11B (reporting that today the NCAA supports gender equity, as evidenced by the
various NCAA Gender Equity Task Forces).
[Vol. 44:841
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program that receives direct federal funding.4' Because most university
athletic programs receive no direct federal funding, under this approach
athletics would be exempt from Title IX scrutiny.42 The institution-wide
approach, 3 in contrast, encompasses every single program or activity
within an institution that receives federal funds." Ultimately, Title IX
and its control over university athletic programs comes down to a choice
of one of these approaches. 5
Debate regarding the definition of recipient began even before Con-
gress enacted Title IX.46 The bill originally proposed in Congress by Sen-
ator Birch Bayh advocated the institution-wide approach,47 but Title IX,
as passed, contained no definitive language. The Act defined recipient
with the ambiguous term, "under any education program or activity" to
determine the breadth of the Act.4 ' Therefore, the government agencies
responsible for awarding federal funds, such as HEW and DED, had to
clarify Title IX's applicability to athletics.49
Section 1682 of the Act, enacted in 1972, directed HEW to promulgate
regulations ensuring that recipients of federal funding complied with the
41. See University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 324-25 (E.D. Va. 1982). The
University of Richmond argued that the Act should be interpreted in a program-specific
manner and, therefore, the university's athletic program was not within the Act's scope.
Id.
42. See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing how athletic departments are
funded).
43. See generally Paul J. Van de Graaf, Note, The Program-Specific Reach of Title IX,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1215-16 (1983) (citing two cases that interpreted Title IX in a
broad, institution-wide manner).
44. See Bell, 543 F. Supp. at 325 (espousing that the institution-wide approach should
be adopted).
45. See Krakora, supra note 6, at 223 (commenting that this debate is particularly im-
portant in the area of athletics).
46. See Othen v. Ann Arbor Sch. Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(noting that the Senate first examined, but ultimately rejected, a proposal that clearly con-
strued Title IX in an institution-wide manner).
47. 117 CONG. REc. 30,156 (1971). Senator Birch Bayh's original proposal prohibited
discrimination "under any program or activity conducted by a public institution.., which
is a recipient of Federal financial assistance," Id. For an examination of the floor debate
that accompanied Title IX, see Mary Beth Petriella, An Interim Preliminary Injunction
Reinstating Varsity Status to Demoted Collegiate Athletic Teams Is Available When That
Team Alleges A Title IX Violation and Litigation Is Pending-Cohen v. Brown Univ., 4
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 595 (1994) (noting that Senator Bayh desired a strong measure
that would eliminate gender discrimination in education).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
49. Id. § 1682; see Krakora, supra note 6, at 224-25 (noting the congressional debate
concerning who should decide the scope of Title IX). Congress made no decisions on the
issue, but instead delegated the job of promulgating appropriate regulations to HEW.
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 580 (1993).
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Act." As of 1974, HEW had not yet promulgated regulations, and thus
the confusion surrounding the definition of "program or activity" per-
sisted.51 Congress responded to the confusion by passing § 844 of the
Education Amendments of 1974. That section required the Secretary of
HEW to propose and publish Title IX regulations that specifically ad-
dressed intercollegiate athletics.52 In 1975, HEW promulgated these reg-
ulations 53 and clarified Title IX's applicability to college athletic
programs. In the regulations, HEW adopted the institution-wide ap-
proach, and defined "recipient" as any entity receiving or benefiting from
federal funding.5 4 This meant that the athletic program of any college or
university that received any federal support was subject to Title IX.55
The regulations are very similar to § 1681 of the Act except that they
expressly provide that no person may be discriminated against in any ath-
letic activity offered by a recipient.56 The regulations allow some excep-
tions for contact sports and sports in which teams are chosen on the basis
of competitive skill,57 but generally, they apply to all intercollegiate ath-
50. The Act provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed
to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such pro-
gram or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability
which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute author-
izing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
20 U.S.C. § 1682.
51. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) (noting that § 844 of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1974 required the Secretary of HEW to promulgate Title IX
regulations).
52. The Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 84 Stat. 484, 612 (1974)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1988)). Section 844 provides:
The Secretary of [HEW] shall prepare and publish ... proposed regulations im-
plementing the provisions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 re-
lating to the prohibition of sex discrimination in federally assisted education
programs which shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities rea-
sonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.
Id.
53. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1994); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893
(1st Cir. 1993) (noting that HEW promulgated Title IX regulations in 1975 under congres-
sional direction).
54. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the regulations).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1994); see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894 (noting that the Supreme
Court's Grove City College decision "radically altered the contemporary reading of Title
IX").
56. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1994). The regulations state that no person shall be discrim-
inated against "in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered
by a recipient." Id.
57. Id. § 106.41(b). The regulations provide that a recipient may provide separate
teams for each sex where the selection of the teams is based on competitive skill or the
1995] Title IX - College Athletics
letics.58 The most important provision of the regulations mandates that a
recipient shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes.59 In determining equality of opportunity, the regulations offer a
non-exhaustive list of ten factors a compliance investigation should con-
sider.6" The most important factor, and the hardest to measure, is the
first: whether the athletic program is "effectively accommodat[ing] the
interests and abilities of members of both sexes."'"
The regulations' adoption of the institution-wide approach62 soon im-
pacted college athletic programs, which were now clearly covered by the
Act.63 In the three years'following the July 1975 promulgation of the
regulations, HEW received over 100 discrimination complaints in college
athletics alone.64 In an effort to encourage self-regulation, HEW clarified
the regulations by offering a Policy Interpretation that provided further
guidance as to what constituted compliance. 65 The HEW Policy Interpre-
sport is a contact sport. Id. The regulations define contact sports to include boxing, wres-
tling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and any other sport where the purpose or
activity involves bodily contact. Id. But see Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 747
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that female ice hockey is played at 15 colleges in the Northeast),
vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
58. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994).
59. Id. § 106.41(c). The regulation states that "[a] recipient which operates or spon-
sors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes." Id.
60. Id. To determine equal athletic opportunity, the following factors, among others,
will be considered:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; (2) The provision of
equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and practice time; (4) Travel
and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutor-
ing; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) Provision of
locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) Provision of medical and
training facilities and services; (9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and
services; (10) Publicity.
Id. The regulations add that unequal aggregate expenditures alone will not equate to non-
compliance but will be considered in assessing equality of opportunity. Id.
61. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that, in evalu-
ating the charges against the university, effectively accommodating the interests and abili-
ties of female students is the most critical and difficult factor to measure).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1994) (adopting a broad institution-wide definition of
recipient).
63. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1994) (requiring recipients to comply with Title IX within
three years of the July 21, 1975 effective date of the regulations); see Krakora, supra note 6,
at 225 (stating that HEW's broad interpretation of the statute is significant, particularly in
relation to college athletics).
64. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
65. Id. The Policy Interpretation originated in a two-step process. Id. at 71,414. In
December 1978, HEW published a proposed Policy Interpretation. Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, A Proposed Policy Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (Office
of Civil Rights, Office of the Secretary, HEW (1978)). This proposal drew over 700 com-
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tation attempted to clarify the regulations' use of the phrase "equal
opportunity."'
The Policy Interpretation, which still is used today in Title IX cases, is a
complex document, but, reduced to its simplest terms, it delineates three
areas that have been used by both the DED's Office of Civil Rights
(OCR)67 and the courts in rendering Title IX compliance decisions.68
Compliance in financial assistance (scholarships) based on athletic ability
is the first area addressed by the Policy Interpretation. 69 Here, compli-
ance is assessed by examining whether men's and women's teams receive
proportionally equal amounts of financial aid. 70 The second area consid-
ers whether a program is in compliance by examining the nature of the
benefits afforded to members of each sex.71 While non-compliance with
any of the three areas may constitute a violation of Title IX,7 2 it is the
third area which has become the main focus of Title IX litigation.73 The
ments, representing a broad range of opinions. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg.
71,413 (1979). Additionally, HEW visited eight campuses to ensure that the proposal
would be practical. Id. Step two was the promulgation of the final Policy Interpretation,
which reflects both the comments HEW received and the results of the campus visits. Id.
This final interpretation served to clarify the phrase "equal opportunity" in college athlet-
ics, as used in the regulations. Id.
66. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (1979); see Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.) (noting that the Policy Interpretation
explains how colleges may effectively accommodate students' interests and abilities), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the agency in charge of ad-
ministering Title IX).
68. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415-19 (1979) (delineating the
three major compliance areas under Title IX).
69. Id. at 71,415.
70. Id. The Policy Interpretation makes it clear that in terms of financial assistance, a
dollar for dollar comparison will not be undertaken, rather the total amount of scholarship
aid made available to men and women must be substantially proportionate to their respec-
tive participation rates. Id. The Policy Interpretation also notes two nondiscriminatory
factors that may be taken into account. Id. These two factors are the difference between
in and out-of-state tuition, and reasonable decisions by the school regarding the develop-
ment of new teams. Id.
71. Id. Compliance is assessed by "comparing the availability, quality and kinds of
benefits, opportunities, and treatment afforded members of both sexes." Id.
72. See ELLEN VARGYUS, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CENTER, TITLE IX BAsics 6, 15 n.71
(1994) (noting cases that reject the proposition that a plaintiff must make out a violation in
each of the three compliance areas to prevail on a Title IX claim). But cf. Gonyo v. Drake
Univ., 1995 WL 127059 (S.D. Iowa March 10, 1995). The court concluded that the male
athletes, though they comprised 75.3% of the athletes and received only 47% of athletic
financial assistance, did not make out a Title IX case because scholarships "remain only a
part of the larger picture, logically subordinate to the overarching goal [of equal opportu-
nity]." Id. at *3, *5.
73. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting the impor-
tance of the third compliance area).
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critical third area measures compliance based on whether a university's
athletic program meets the interests and abilities of its students.74 The
courts measure compliance with the interests and abilities area by refer-
ring to the Policy Interpretation's three-benchmark test.7
The first benchmark of the three-benchmark test, assesses compliance
by determining whether athletic participation opportunities are substan-
tially proportionate to undergraduate enrollment figures.76 The second
benchmark determines whether the university can show a history and
continuing practice of expansion in the program's of the traditionally
under-represented gender.77 The third benchmark determines whether
the university has fully and effectively accommodated the interests and
abilities of the under-represented sex.7 8
Having delineated the three compliance areas and the three-bench-
mark test, the Policy Interpretation next speaks to the enforcement mech-
anisms of Title IX.7 9 ' Title IX investigations arise in two methods: first, by
periodic compliance reviews where the OCR selects a number of recipi-
ents and investigates their compliance with the Act;8° or second, by inves-
tigating a valid complaint.8 ' If, after either type of investigation, the
DED finds a recipient is not in compliance with Title IX, it first will at-
tempt to negotiate a compliance plan with the recipient.82 If voluntary
74. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417-18 (1979). The third area is re-
ferred to as either the "interests and abilities" strand or the "measuring effective compli-
ance" strand. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897.
75. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) (noting the application of
a three-part test when assessing effective accommodation).
76. Id. The Policy Interpretation does not define what constitutes substantial propor-
tionality. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. In sum, the Policy Interpretation uses two, three-part tests to assess Title IX
compliance. Id. at 71,415-19. First is an examination of the three areas of compliance:
athletic financial assistance (scholarships) given to male and female athletes; equivalence
in other athletic benefits and opportunities; and effective accommodation of student inter-
ests and abilities. Id. at 71,415-18. This third area is most difficult to decipher than the
first two, so the Policy Interpretation offers a second three-part test to guide decision mak-
ing on whether there has been effective accommodation of students interests and abilities.
Id. at 71,418. The courts have adopted this three-benchmark test and applied it in recent
Title IX cases. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828-29 (10th Cir.)
(applying the three-benchmark test of the Policy Interpretation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 196, 200-213 (D.R.I. 1995);
79. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) (describing the en-
forcement process of Title IX); Anderson, supra note 7, at 79 (discussing how the Depart-
ment of Education enforces Title IX).
80. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979).
81. Id. (noting that a valid complaint is one that is written, timely, and alleges gender
discrimination by a recipient).
82. Id. The Policy Interpretation notes that to be acceptable, "a plan must describe
the manner in which institutional resources will be used to correct the violation." Id. If
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compliance attempts do not work, or if the plan is not implemented, the
recipient will be found in noncompliance and "the formal process leading
to termination of Federal assistance will [begin].
'
"83
It was against this backdrop of regulations and the HEW Policy Inter-
pretation that student athletes initially filed Title IX actions.' Between
1979 and 1984, the DED pursued over forty Title IX investigations in
university athletic programs.s5 These investigations, however, came to an
unexpected halt in 1984 with the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City
College v. Bell.86
B. Athletic Departments Breathe a Sigh of Relief
While the regulations and Policy Interpretation clearly favored the in-
stitution-wide approach over the program-specific option, 7 as of 1984 no
judicial consensus existed.88 The Supreme Court, therefore, granted cer-
tiorari in Grove City College to resolve whether Title IX applied only to
specific programs receiving federal funds or if it applied to all of the de-
partments within a recipient institution.89
TWo years prior to Grove City College, in North Haven Board of Edu-
cation v. Bell,9° the Court noted that Title IX's language and legislative
history dictated that Title IX's administering agencies could regulate and
terminate funding subject to the program-specific limitations of §§ 901
and 902.91 The North Haven decision restricted the government's regula-
tory function under Title IX and thus undermined the assumption that
the plan is acceptable, the department will notify the recipient and review the implementa-
tion of the plan periodically. Id.
83. Id. at 71,419. But see Carol Herwig, Sportsviews, USA TODAY, July 2, 1993, at 12C
(noting that the remedy of pulling federal funding has never been invoked).
84. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 532 (E.D. Penn. 1981), aff'd, 688
F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
85. Villalobos, supra note 20, at 159 (discussing pending Title IX cases at the time of
the Grove City College decision).
86. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
87. See supra notes 50-82 and accompanying text (discussing the regulations and Pol-
icy Interpretation).
88. Compare Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 79-80 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (adopting the programmatic approach), rev'd, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983), and cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 903 (1984) and Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1381
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (relying on the language in section 1681 of the Act to opt for the pro-
gram-specific approach), aff'd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983) with Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at
540-41 (adopting the institution-wide approach).
89. 465 U.S. at 555.
90. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
91. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 570 (quoting North Haven, 456 U.S. at 538).
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Title IX was to be construed broadly.92 The Court relied in part on North
Haven when it decided Grove City College v. Bell.93
In Grove City College, the Court examined whether Title IX applied to
a private, coeducational college that accepted no federal or state funding
and did not accept federal financial aid.94 The only connection Grove
City College had to federal assistance was that a number of its students
received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) from the
DED.95 In fact, Justice White, writing for the majority in Grove City Col-
lege, stated that only by ignoring the program-specific language of Title
IX could the Court conclude that the receipt of BEOGs by some students
represented federal aid to the entire institution.9 6 The Court further rea-
soned that under the institution-wide approach, if only one student at
Grove City College received federal aid, the entire school would be sub-
ject to the rigors of Title IX compliance.97 The Court acknowledged that
such an extreme result could not have been Congress' intent when it
passed the Act.98 As a result, the Court concluded that the institution-
wide approach was inappropriate. 99
The Grove City College decision perplexed both the DED, which was
conducting Title IX compliance investigations, and university administra-
tors, who were defending those investigations.'00 As a result of Grove
City College, the DED subsequently discontinued or narrowed forty
pending investigations because the athletic program in question received
no direct federal aid,' including an investigation at the University of
92. Karen Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell: Touchdown or Touchback?, 43 MD.
L. REv. 379, 380-81 (1984) (explaining that according to North Haven, the government's
regulatory function was only program-specific).
93. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
94. Id. at 559.
95. 1& (discussing BEOG's in more detail).
96. See id. at 571. The Court concluded that the receipt of Basic Educational Oppor-
tunity Grants "does not trigger institution-wide coverage under Title IX." Id. at 573. The
Court added that the only program or activity receiving federal funds in this case is the
financial aid program, not the entire college. Id. at 571.
97. Id. at 572-73.
98. Id. at 573.
99. See id.
100. See Villalobos, supra note 20, at 163-64 (stating that OCR refrained from investi-
gating complaints unless the athletic department received direct federal funding).
101. B. Glenn George, Miles To Go and Promises To Keep: A Case Study In Title IX, 64
U. COLO. L. REv. 555, 558 (1993) (noting that athletic departments do not usually receive
direct federal funding); see Krakora, supra note 6, at 223 n.9 (according to one athletic
director, at most of the nation's colleges federal financial aid does not go directly to ath-
letic programs); see also Glenn M. Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Sex Discrimination in Athlet-
ics: A Review of Two Decades of Accomplishments and Defeats, 21 GONz. L. REv. 345,
351-52 (1986) (noting that 23 Title IX investigations were ended as a direct result of the
Grove City College decision).
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Maryland where discrimination had already been discovered. 10 2 Addi-
tionally, the Grove City College decision caused the OCR to stop moni-
toring three schools that were in the process of implementing Title IX
compliance programs.'0 3 As a result of Grove City College, female
coaches, athletes, and teams were left with little or no protection from the
discrimination Title IX was designed to remedy.104
C. Congress Revitalizes Title IX
In an effort to reverse Grove City College, Congress re-adopted the
institution-wide approach'0 5 in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
(Restoration Act)." 6 This Act forbids discrimination in the programs or
activities of a recipient of federal money. 10 7 To ensure that Title IX was
applied in an institution-wide manner, Congress defined "programs or ac-
tivities" as any institute of higher education that receives federal funds.0 8
Further, Congress defined "recipient" as any state, public, or private
agency, institution, or organization that either directly or indirectly re-
ceives federal funds.' 9 While the Restoration Act did not specifically
mention athletics, Senate floor debates indicate that the Act was intended
to "creat[e] a more level playing field for female athletes." 1 0 This legis-
lation clarified Congressional intent to reverse the impact of the Grove
City College decision and to ensure the continued development of female
athletic programs."'
102. Villalobos, supra note 20, at 160 (discussing the discontinued Title IX investigation
at the University of Maryland).
103. Id. at 162 (noting the three schools: Western Michigan, Ohio, and Ball State
Universities).
104. Id. at 160 (commenting that the decision to drop discrimination charges against the
University of Maryland left female coaches and athletes without federal protection).
105. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993); see Villalobos, supra note
20, at 149 n.4 (explaining the initial controversy the Act aroused, and that it eventually
passed over President Reagan's veto).
106. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1687. The Act requires "that if any arm of an educational institution
received federal funds, the institution as a whole must comply with Title IX's provisions."
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894.
108. Villalobos, supra note 20, at 162. The Act states that "program or activity" means
a college, university, or post-secondary institution, or public system of higher education,
any part of which is extended federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A).
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2)(A).
110. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894 (noting the comments of three senators involved in the
debate surrounding the Act concerning discrimination in athletics). Congress, in passing
§ 1687, stated that it was necessary to broaden Title IX in light of the undue narrowing of
the Act by the Supreme Court. § 2, 102 Stat. at 28.
111. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894 (noting the remarks of Senator Hatch regarding the
importance of Title IX in the development of women athletes).
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The supporters of the Restoration Act hoped its passage would sustain
the growth that women's sports had achieved between the passing of Title
IX in 1972 and Grove City College.112 In fact, the Restoration Act had an
immediate impact on Title IX, in the first six months following passage,
the OCR received sixteen new gender discrimination complaints.1 1 3 Re-
cent federal circuit and district court decisions on Title IX claims demon-
strate that the impact of the Restoration Act on Title IX is still prevalent
today."
14
II. THE COURTS SPEAK: PRESENT JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF TITLE IX
CASES
A. Present Title IX Litigation Issues
In 1993, federal courts rendered decisions in several Title IX actions
involving university athletic programs." 5 The traditional Title IX litiga-
tion involves cases in which a group of female athletes claim a university
may not legally eliminate their team because doing so would violate Title
IX.1 16 A newer type of Title IX litigation focuses on cases in which an
eliminated male team brings suit asking for reinstatement alleging gender
discrimination in violation of Title IX.117 To discern the modern judicial
112. Villalobos, supra note 20, at 163 (noting that between 1972 and 1985, the number
of women's athletic scholarships went from virtually zero to over 10,000); Wong & Ensor,
supra note 101, at 347 (noting a 15% growth in female college athletes between 1972 and
1984).
113. Villalobos, supra note 20, at 163 n.127; see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (commenting on
"the recent boom in Title IX suits"); Christina A. Longo and Elizabeth F. Thoman, Com-
ment, Haffer v. Temple University: A Reawakening of Gender Discrimination in Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 16 J.C. & U.L. 137, 147 n.64 (1989) (listing the schools that had complaints
filed against them in the immediate aftermath of the Restoration Act).
114. See Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 272-73 (7th Cir.
1994) (ruling that the elimination of men's teams did not violate Title IX), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 938 (1995); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 334-35 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring
the university to reinstate two previously eliminated female athletic teams); Roberts v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 998 F.2d 824, 834-35 (10th Cir.) (upholding the reinstatement
of the women's softball team), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907
(affirming the injunction that forced Brown University to reinstate two female teams);
Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 995-96 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (stating that the elimina-
tion of the men's wrestling team did not violate Title IX).
115. See supra note 114 (explaining the decision in each of these cases).
116. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 826; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 891 (requesting an injunction to rein-
state the women's volleyball and gymnastics programs to varsity status); Cook v. Colgate,
802 F. Supp. 737, 751 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (deciding in favor of a women's ice hockey team
that consistently had been denied varsity status), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
1993); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 521-22 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (deciding an un-
lawful gender discrimination claim brought by female students at Temple University).
117. Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 239 (C.D. Ill. 1993)
(hearing, and subsequently denying, the men's swim team's claim that by eliminating their
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analysis, the cases brought by both women and men must be examined
separately. Once a framework has been established, the similarities and
differences between these cases can be examined to provide a compre-
hensive judicial analysis of Title IX actions.
1. Title IX Actions Brought by Female Athletes
In 1993, three United States courts of appeals decided cases brought by
members of women's athletic teams. In Cohen v. Brown University,
118
members of two eliminated women's teams challenged a decision by the
university to rectify budget problems by eliminating four varsity sports
teams.119 Brown University discontinued the men's golf and water polo
teams and the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams. 2 ° At the time
of the cuts, the undergraduate population at Brown consisted of 52%
men and 48% women,12' yet men represented 63.3 % and women only
36.7% of the athletes.12 2 Following their elimination, members of the two
women's teams brought suit under Title IX's implied cause of action.'
2 3
The female athletes alleged that by eliminating these women's teams,
Brown had violated Title IX's prohibition on gender-based
discrimination.
124
The First Circuit, after a lengthy discussion of Title IX's legislative his-
tory, regulations, and the Policy Interpretation, determined that because
Congress explicitly had delegated the task of promulgating regulations, 25
those regulations, including the Policy Interpretation, deserved "control-
team, the university had unlawfully discriminated against them), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 990 (contending that
elimination of the men's wrestling team constituted gender discrimination in violation of
Title IX).
118. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
119. See id. at 892 n.3 (noting that demotion from varsity to club status is equivalent to
elimination because other colleges' varsity squads are reluctant to compete against club
teams).
120. Id. at 892. These cuts were designed to save the university $77,813 per year. Id.
The savings broke down as follows: women's volleyball, $37,127; women's gymnastics,
$24,901; men's water polo, $9,250; men's golf, $6,545. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (explaining that elimination of these four teams did not change the percentage
of participation opportunities for male or female athletes at Brown University).
123. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699, 717 (1979) (recognizing an
implied right of action under Title IX); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503
U.S. 60, 63-66 (1992) (allowing monetary damages in Title IX suits). The damage remedy
has made Title IX suits more important for universities because such a remedy is likely to
be very costly. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 556 (elaborating on the importance of mone-
tary damages).
124. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893. The plaintiffs charged that Brown's athletic arrangements
violated Title IX's ban on gender-based discrimination. Id.
125. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX's regulations).
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ling weight."' 26 Thus, the court accorded the regulations appreciable def-
erence in upholding the district court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction. 127 Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court in
holding that the two, three-part tests set out in the Policy Interpretation
are appropriate to apply in Title IX cases.
128
In Cohen, of the three major areas of regulatory compliance only the
third area, effective accommodation of interests and abilities, was at issue.
The other two areas, financial assistance and other athletic benefits, were
not issues because Brown University offered no athletic scholarships and
the plaintiff made no allegations of discrimination in other athletic bene-
fits. 129 The First Circuit held that equal opportunity lies at the core of
Title IX's purpose, 3 ' and that an institution can violate Title IX by not
meeting the effective accommodation standard, even if it meets the other
two standards.' 3 ' Measuring the effective accommodation of students' in-
terests and abilities, therefore, was the pivotal issue in Cohen.132 The
First Circuit, in deciding how to assess effective accommodation, looked
to the Policy Interpretation's three-benchmark test.
133
Under the three-benchmark test, Brown University could not satisfy
benchmark number one because its undergraduate and athletic popula-
tions were not substantially proportionate.3 The court rejected Brown's
126. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (noting that DED's interpretation of Title IX must be given
appreciable deference).
127. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984); see also WILLIAM F. Fox JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 304-05
(2d ed. 1992). Chevron is the seminal case explaining the deference courts pay to an
agency's position where Congress has not spoken on the issue. Id. at 304. In Chevron, the
Supreme Court adopted the "Chevron two-step," in which a court first determines whether
the specific issue has been spoken to by Congress. Id. If Congress has spoken, both courts
and agencies must defer to the congressional position. Id. If Congress is either silent or
ambiguous, a court examines the agency's position and must defer to that position if the
agency's action is reasonable. Id.
128. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897-98 (noting that the parties agreed that the only portion of
the Policy Interpretation at issue was the effective accommodation area); see supra notes
67-78 and accompanying text (describing the three-benchmark test).
129. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897 n.12 (explaining that while the plaintiffs did not allege
discrimination in other athletic benefits, the district court reserved the right to make find-
ings on that issue).
130. Id. at 897.
131. Id. (meeting both the financial assistance and athletic equivalency standards is not
enough to bring a recipient into compliance with Title IX).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 903. The court noted that Brown clearly failed the substantial proportional-
ity test. Id. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 191 n.16, 211 (D.R.I. 1995)
(detailing the proportion of students to athletes at Brown). Brown did not challenge this
finding in the preliminary injunction hearing because the percentage of female undergrad-
uates was much higher than the percentage of female athletes. See also Cohen v. Brown
1995]
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argument that it met benchmark number two through a large expansion
of women's programs in the 1970s.' 35 The court found no continuing ex-
pansion of women's sports because Brown failed to foster the growth of
women's teams after the initial expansion in the 1970s. 13 6 Finally, in con-
cluding that the plaintiffs satisfied the third benchmark,'137 the court
noted that when a school eliminates a team and those athletes are the
plaintiffs, there is little question that they have met the interests and abili-
ties benchmark.
131
The court concluded that because the plaintiffs had met their burden of
proving benchmarks one and three, and Brown had not effectively shown
a continued practice of growth, the plaintiffs had established a strong
likelihood of success at trial and the balancing of the harms favored the
plaintiffs. 39 Concluding this, the First Circuit affirmed the preliminary
injunction reinstating the women's teams, and remanded the case to the
district court for a trial on the merits.14°
At trial, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land ruled on Brown's compliance with the three-benchmark test.' 4' The
court ruled that because the gender ratio in Brown's intercollegiate ath-
letic program did not substantially mirror the gender ratio of the student
body, the plaintiffs had proven that Brown's athletic program violated the
Univ, 809 F. Supp. 978, 991 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). In attempting
to discern the meaning of substantial proportionality, courts look to the language of the
Title IX Athletic Investigator's Manual. VALERIE M. BONNEi-rE & LAMAR DANIEL, DE-
PARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990); see
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 580 (1993). The Roberts court rationalized that while the manual offers no set ratio
as to what constitutes substantial proportionality, it does indicate that the concept entails a
fairly close relationship between undergraduate enrollment and athletic participation. Id.
But see Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 197 n.27 (declining to rely on the Investigator's Manual in
disposition of the case).
135. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903.
136. Id. The First Circuit noted that while Brown University exhibited "impressive
growth" in the 1970s the school failed to show growth in women's athletics in the next two
decades. Id. The district court added, and the First Circuit agreed, that Brown spent six
years, 1971 through 1977, introducing women's sports, but since, the school has "rested on
its laurels for at least twice that long." Id. See also Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 190; Cohen, 809
F. Supp. at 981 (describing in greater depth the history of Brown's athletic programs).
137. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
138. See id. (noting that the third benchmark is not a difficult standard to meet if an
existing team is seeking reinstatement).
139. Id. at 905-06. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the likeli-
hood of success at trial weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiffs and that, on balance, the
potential harm to the plaintiffs in having their sports eliminated outweighed Brown's finan-
cial difficulties. Id. Therefore, an injunction should be issued. Id. at 906.
140. Id. at 907.
141. See Cohen v. Brown University, 879 F. Supp. 185, 199-200, 211 (D.R.I. 1995) (ap-
plying the three prong test).
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substantial proportionality benchmark. 42 The court further decided that
Brown did not satisfy its burden of proving a history and continued prac-
tice of program expansion by its action of adding two women's teams
since 1977.143 Finally, the court determined that Brown had not "fully
and effectively accommodated the interest and ability of the under-
represented sex," and, therefore, failed the third benchmark.'" In sum;
by not satisfying any of the three benchmarks, the court held that Brown
was in violation of Title IX.145
The Tenth Circuit employed a similar analysis in Roberts v. Colorado
State Board of Agriculture.46 Female members of the Colorado State
University (CSU) varsity softball team sought injunctive relief to prevent
the school from discontinuing their team.147 CSU claimed that the elimi-
nation did not violate Title IX and, therefore, the court should not grant
an injunction.148 The Tenth Circuit, in deciding to issue the injunction,
began its analysis by determining that the main issue in Roberts was effec-
tive accommodation. 149 To measure effective accommodation, the Tenth
Circuit, like the First Circuit in Cohen, turned to the Policy Interpreta-
tion. 5 ° The Tenth Circuit first examined the three broad areas in which
the DED's OCR assesses compliance in effective accommodation
142. See id. at 199-211. The court noted that substantial proportionality "must be a
standard stringent enough to effectuate the purposes of the statute ... [yet still] account[ ]
for the possibility of minor fluctuations in the undergraduate population... from one year
to the next." Id. at 202. The Court then ruled that Brown's disparity of 13.01% "is far
from substantially proportionate." Id at 211.
143. Id. The court noted that since 1977, Brown added women's indoor track and wo-
men's skiing in 1982 and 1994, respectively. Id.
144. Id. at 211-12. The Court found that Brown had violated the third benchmark on
two levels. Id. at 212. First, by demoting a viable gymnastics team the school had not fully
accommodated the interests of those athletes, and secondly, by not upgrading the women's
skiing and fencing teams from donor-funded to university-funded status, the school failed
to accommodate those athletes. Id The court recognized that by requiring the school to
upgrade viable teams they were breaking new ground in the area of the third benchmark,
but felt that the Policy Interpretation demanded such a reading. Id.
145. Jeffrey Michaelson, co-counsel for Brown University commented that Brown plans
to appeal the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Athelia Knight & Mark
Asher, Title IX Advocates Hail Ruling Against Brown, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at D1,
D8. Michaelson asserted that "[alt every step of the way, he [Judge Pettine] made substan-
tial errors in the law to reach that conclusion." Id. Michaelson said that if upheld, this
decision reduces Title IX to a quota bill. Id.
146. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
147. Id. at 826.
148. See id.
149. Id at 828-29. The court deduced that the plaintiffs' claims centered around their
opportunity to participate in team competition and therefore, "[t]he heart of the contro-
versy is the meaning of the phrase 'full and effective accommodation of interests and abili-
ties.' " Id. at 828, 831.
150. Id. at 828.
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cases:15' the determination of athletic interests and abilities; the selection
of sports offered; and the levels of competition available.' 52 After deter-
mining that the plaintiffs' claim centered on the participation opportuni-
ties at CSU, the Tenth Circuit applied the three-benchmark test.
53
Applying the first benchmark, the Roberts court found that a 10.5%
disparity between women's enrollment and their athletic participation did
not constitute substantial proportionality and that, accordingly, CSU
failed the first benchmark.' 54 The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the district
court's decision that CSU had not proven a history and continuing prac-
tice of expansion in women's athletics 155 because no women's teams had
been created since 1977.156 Regarding the third benchmark, the Tenth
Circuit noted that the district court erred in placing the burden of proving
the third benchmark on the university, but held that the flaw did not con-
stitute reversible error.
1 57
The Roberts court stated that plaintiffs carry the burden of proving
both the first and third benchmarks. 158 If these burdens are satisfied, the
university uses the second benchmark as an affirmative defense. 159 The
Roberts court maintained that the district court's misplaced burden was
not fatal because testimony had established that the plaintiffs were mem-
bers of a successful varsity softball team in 1992,16° and first year females
151. Id.
152. Id.; see Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413-17 (1979) (noting the
three factors that OCR uses in assessing compliance with the interests and abilities section
of the regulation).
153. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29. The court, after a close reading of the Policy
Interpretation, assessed the plaintiffs' claim under the effective accommodation three-
benchmark test. Id.
154. Id. at 829-30. The appellate court relied on expert testimony received by the dis-
trict court in agreeing that a 10.5% disparity is not substantially proportionate. Id.
155. Id. at 830.
156. Id. The Policy Interpretation places the burden on the institution to show this
continuing practice. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979). As was
the case in Cohen, the Tenth Circuit applauded CSU's efforts in the 1970s to create a
women's athletic program. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830. However, while CSU created 11 wo-
men's teams in that decade, the district court found that during the 1980s women's sports
at CSU declined. Id. The last women's sport CSU added was the women's golf team in
1977, yet since that time three women's teams had been eliminated. Id.
157. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831. In analyzing the third benchmark, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that the district court improperly had placed the burden of proof on the defendant.
Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. Because lack of substantial proportionality alone, will not result in a Title
IX violation, plaintiffs also must show that the university does not fully and effectively
accommodate their interests and abilities. Id.
160. Id. at 832.
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were interested in playing varsity softball. 6 ' This evidence convinced the
Tenth Circuit that the plaintiffs would have carried the burden of proving
that their interests and abilities had not been fully and effectively accom-
modated.162 The Tenth Circuit remanded and ordered reinstatement of
the team.
163
In Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,'" the Third Circuit
heard the university's appeal of an earlier Title IX decision. In 1991, In-
diana University of Pennsylvania (IUP), citing budgetary concerns, elimi-
nated two male and two female varsity teams. 65 Members of the
women's gymnastics and field hockey teams brought a Title IX class ac-
tion suit,' 66 seeking a decree, to force the university to comply with Title
IX, and an injunction reinstating their teams. 167 The district court, apply-
ing the three-benchmark test, determined that IUP was not in compliance
with Title IX and consequently issued an injunction reinstating the
teams. 168 IUP filed a motion to modify the preliminary injunction en-
161. Id.
162. See id.; see also Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1517
(D. Colo.) (noting the lack of effective accommodation), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). The district court discussed the
growing popularity of women's fast-pitch softball in Colorado. Il Testimony showed that
participation in fast-pitch softball in Colorado had more than doubled in the last 10 years.
Id. The district court recognized the significance of this growth in noting that 75% of
CSU's undergraduates come from Colorado high schools. Id. Ultimately, the court con-
cluded that CSU failed to meet the interests and abilities of female softball players. Id.
Acknowledging the sport's growing popularity, the court also noted that women's fast-
pitch softball will be a medal sport at the 1996 Summer Olympics. Id.
163. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834-35. The case was remanded because the district court
exceeded its authority in demanding that CSU field a team to play a fall 1993 exhibition
schedule. Id. The Tenth Circuit added that Title IX does not require "an institution to
create a 'top flight' varsity team," nor can the courts try to insure that the reinstated team
has a winning season. Id. at 835.
164. 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
165. Id. at 335; see Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 581 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993). The school eliminated four sports: men's soccer and tennis, and
women's gymnastics and field hockey. Id. at 578. University officials, citing a decline in
the popularity of women's gymnastics and field hockey, determined that these two sports
were no longer viable. Id. at 580. They decided that implementing a women's soccer pro-
gram would better serve student interest. Id.
166. See Favia, 7 F.3d at 335; see also Cook v. Colgate, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)
(showing the importance of class action suits in the Title IX context). In Cook, the Second
Circuit declared the case moot because all of the plaintiffs would have graduated by the
time Colgate made the requested changes. Id. at 19.
167. Favia, 7 F.3d at 335.
168. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585-86. The district court found that IUP did not meet
the substantial proportionality benchmark because only 37.77% of the athletes were fe-
male while 55.61% of the students were female. Id. at 584-85. The eliminations in ques-
tion enlarged this gap. Id. IUP failed to show a continuing practice of expansion and,
therefore, failed the second benchmark. Id. As for the third benchmark, the university did
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abling them to add a women's soccer team instead of reinstating the two
teams they had eliminated.'69 The district court refused to permit IUP to
modify the injunction, a decision the Third Circuit affirmed. 7 °
2. Eliminated Male Teams and the Judicial Analysis
While courts that have analyzed cases brought by female athletes con-
sistently adhere to the Policy Interpretation's three-benchmark test,'
courts have taken different approaches when men's teams have chal-
lenged elimination.'72 In Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illi-
nois faced an issue of first impression-a men's team suing under Title
IX to have their team reinstated. 73 In 1993, the University of Illinois,
citing budget concerns, announced that it was eliminating the men's
swimming and fencing teams, and the men's and women's diving
teams. 74 The members of the men's swim team argued that because the
university did not eliminate the women's swim team, the school had vio-
lated Title IX.175 Rejecting this argument, the district court examined the
not fully and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the women whose
teams were eliminated simply by honoring their scholarships. Id.
169. Favia, 7 F.3d at 336. IUP showed that this change would save the university
money and bring the athletic program much closer to compliance. Id. at 336, 343.
170. See id. at 343-44. The court, in rejecting this request, stated that by allowing IUP
to create a women's soccer team instead of reinstating the eliminated teams, the plaintiffs
would become losers when in fact they had won their case. Id. at 344.
171. The cases discussed in the prior section have decided whether a temporary injunc-
tion should be issued to reinstate the eliminated teams. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado
State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 (D. Colo.) (ordering the university to reinstate the
softball team), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), and cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585 (ordering reinstatement of the eliminated
teams); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 980 (D.R.I. 1992) (issuing an injunction),
aff'd 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). The circuit courts then heard the appeals from the
district courts' rulings. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (af-
firming and remanding for trial); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia, 7 F.3d at 332. After deciding whether
the district court was correct, the circuit courts have generally remanded the cases to dis-
trict courts for trial.
172. Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 241-42 (C.D. Ill. 1993)
(touching briefly on the three benchmark test), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), and cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
The Gonyo court did not rely on the three benchmark test as a basis for its decision. Id.
But see Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the three-bench-
mark test), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
173. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240-41. The district court stated, "plaintiffs present a legal
question which has not been directly decided by any court in this country to date," and
resolution of it was difficult. Id.
174. Id. at 240. Even though it was eliminating the teams, the university intended to
honor its financial commitments (scholarships) to the athletes. Id.
175. Id. at 239.
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status of athletics at the University of Illinois under the first bench-
mark.' 76 In doing so, the district court found that as long as the reduc-
tions moved the university closer to substantial proportionality, they did
not violate Title IX. 7 The court added that the university could not cut
women's teams because this action would expose the university to Title
IX liability.178 While sympathetic to the plight of the plaintiffs, the court
found no violation of Title IX and refused to reinstate the men's swim-
ming team.' 79 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court's deci-
sion, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that Title IX mandated
discrimination against males.'8
In Gonyo v. Drake University,' 8' the university's men's wrestling team
sought injunctive relief and reinstatement.' 82 Drake University's under-
graduate population in 1992-93 was 57.2% female and 42.8% male.'
8 3
Yet, 60.6% of Division I athletes at Drake were male and only 39.4%
were female."8 Unlike previous cases, the Drake court did not discuss
the regulations or the Policy Interpretation extensively, but simply held
that the university acted in accordance with the purposes of Title IX by
encouraging female athletes to participate, even if this was done at the
expense of male teams. 185 Additionally, the district court found no merit
in the plaintiffs' contention that, due to the elimination, Drake's athletic
176. Id. at 241-42. The court noted that the university may cut men's teams to move
closer to meeting the substantial proportionality requirement of the first benchmark. Id.
Furthermore, the court added that a university may comply "by reducing opportunities for
the overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented
gender." Id. at 242.
177. Id. at 241-42. The court reasoned that, "even if the University's decision were not
based on financial or budgetary reasons, but made solely to move closer to substantial
proportionality ... the failure to cut women's programs would still be countenanced by
Title IX." Id. at 241.
178. Id. at 242 n.6 (stating that the university may have violated Title IX by dropping
the women's diving team). The defendants acknowledged the difficulty they would have
encountered in defending the case if a female diver was also a plaintiff in this case. Id.
179. Id. at 243-44. The court stated that "Congress, in enacting Title IX, probably
never anticipated that it would yield such draconian results." Id. at 243.
180. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265,270 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
938 (1995). The plaintiffs argued that if Title IX requires the elimination of men from
athletic competition, it should require the elimination of women from university depart-
ments where they are over represented. Id. The Seventh Circuit, in rejecting this conten-
tion, said that "such a result would be ridiculous." Id.
181. 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
182. Id. at 990.
183. Id. at 992.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 996. The court discussed and rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection and
breach of contract claims before they addressed the Title IX issue. Id. at 994-95. In dis-
cussing the Title IX claim, the court only briefly addressed the regulations and Policy Inter-
pretation. Id. at 995-96.
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program did not accommodate their interests and abilities. 86 Further,
the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to show they were ex-
cluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimi-
nation in Drake's athletic program.187 The court, in weighing the threat
of irreparable harm 88 against the probability of success,' 89 denied the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction."9
B. Problems with Current Title IX Decision Making
The current judicial analysis of Title IX cases raises a myriad of
problems for both athletes and universities.' 9' As exemplified by Cohen,
Roberts, and Favia, a university generally cannot eliminate womens ath-
letic teams without exposing itself to Title IX litigation.'92 Title IX leaves
186. Id. at 996. The crux of the plaintiffs' argument was that because an obvious inter-
est in wrestling existed at Drake, evidenced by the lawsuit, the wrestler's interests and
abilities were no longer effectively accommodated when their team was eliminated. Id.
The Kelley court also rejected this argument when raised by the male Illinois swimmers.
See Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 243 n.7 (C.D. Ill. 1993),
aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
187. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 996. But cf. infra note 211 and accompanying text (ac-
cepting this argument when proffered by the women's team in Favia).
188. Id. at 993-94 (noting that the athletes would not lose their scholarships and that
they remained free to transfer).
189. See id. at 994-96 (discussing the plaintiffs' minimal likelihood of success).
190. Id at 996.
191. See Charles Bennett, NCAA at the Crossroads, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 25, 1993, at
D1. Athletic directors have two options in dealing with gender equity, either add women's
teams and scholarships or cut the football team. Joe Dean, the athletic director at Louisi-
ana State University stated: "the first option is financially impractical. The second is down-
right heresy." Id. See also Jonathan Feigen, Football Coaches Circle the Wagons,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 28, 1993, at 2C (noting that if the NCAA adopts proportional-
ity, some administrators would have only three men's sports and eleven women's sports);
Mike Dame, To Close the Gender Gap: A Difficult Balancing Act, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Aug. 1, 1993, at C-1, C-11 (noting that due in large part to gender equity, many large
college football programs are considering leaving division I-A); Bill Sullivan, Gender Eq-
uity Troubles CFA, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 5, 1993, at 8C. One athletic director ex-
plained that his school has a $9 million athletic budget and a $1.5 million annual deficit. Id.
If he "went to equity," it would cost an additional $3 million, with little prospect of in-
creased revenue. Id.
192. See Bennett, supra note 191, at D1 (noting that two options exist, add women's
teams or eliminate football, and that both options are impracticable).
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university athletic administrators with few options in responding to a
budget crisis; 193 they can either eliminate men's teams or do nothing. 94
1. The Infeasibility of the Three Benchmarks
The courts have stated that to successfully defend a Title IX case a
university must satisfy one of the Policy Interpretation's three
benchmarks. 195 The problem with this requirement, however, is that uni-
versities find it nearly impossible to meet any of the three benchmarks.
196
Almost no university that offers a full array of sports for both men and
women, including a men's football team, can fulfill the substantial pro-
portionality test of the first benchmark because the size of the football
team yields disproportional percentages in the athletic program. 197 While
there have been a variety of proposals, such as excluding football from
Title IX calculations, aimed at addressing the substantial proportionality
problem, 198 courts have not adopted any of them. The first benchmark is,
193. See Dave Dorr, Battle For Bucks; Gender Equity Triggers Restructuring of College
Sports, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 1994, at 4D (describing the race for additional
revenue to fund gender equity). Frank Windegger athletic director at Texas Christian Uni-
versity said that the present landscape in college sports should be called "[s]crambling for
dollars." Id.
194. Bennett, supra note 191, at D1. As an illustration, suppose a budget crisis forces a
university to cut money from its athletic department budget. To accomplish this, university
administrators seemingly have three options: (1) eliminate male teams; (2) eliminate fe-
male teams; or (3) eliminate some of both. While the third option appears to be the most
equitable, under the current judicial analysis of the Policy Interpretation it is not
permissable. See Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 242 n.6.
(C.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that the University of Illinois likely would violate Title IX if it
eliminated women's teams), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
938 (1995); see also Ed Sherman, Men vs. Women: It's a Brand New Ballgame, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 28, 1993, at C1 (noting that many critics feel the only way to achieve gender equity is
by eliminating men's teams).
195. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that the uni-
versity must meet one of the Policy Interpretation's three benchmarks).
196. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 58-59 (quoting Chris Humm, Brown University sports
information director as stating, "[i]f Brown University is not in compliance, then no school
in the country is"). But see id. at 60 (noting that after being prodded by the courts, Wash-
ington State University seemingly has maintained substantial proportionality).
197. See Athelia Knight, Football Coaches Put Title IX on Defensive; 'New Congress' is
Asked to Hold Hearings, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1995, at C4 (discussing concerns raised by
football coaches regarding substantial proportionality); Anderson, supra note 7, at 77 (not-
ing that the football team is problematic when it comes to Title IX); see also Chuck Neinas,
Purpose of Statute Lost When Focus Put on Proportionality, USA TODAY, May 9, 1995, at
2C (commenting that more attention should be given to the number of sports offered and
program development, rather than simply counting heads).
198. See infra notes 261-86 and accompanying text (noting the football exclusion and
reduction proposals).
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therefore, not an issue in most cases."9 Under the present interpretation
of substantial proportionality, which includes counting members of the
football team, most plaintiffs can easily establish that the university ath-
letic program is not in line with the undergraduate population.2 °°
Just as most universities will fail benchmark number one because of the
difficulty of having equal numbers of athletes and undergraduates, most
will fail benchmark number two simply because college athletics cannot
grow infinitely.21 The problem in meeting the second benchmark is one
of finance. In this time of budget constraints, it is difficult for a university
to justify setting up any new sport, mens or women's, especially when
there is uncertainty about whether the new team will find ample intercol-
legiate competition.20 2 Yet, in both Cohen and Roberts, the courts re-
jected the university's contention that the rapid growth of women's teams
in the 1970s satisfied benchmark number two.20 3 The courts stated that
199. See Sherman, supra note 194, at C1 (discussing how football throws off athletic
department numbers); see also Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830
(10th Cir.) (recognizing that various schools are unable to approach substantial proportion-
ality), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
200. See Knight, supra note 197, at C4. A 1994 survey of 257 Division I colleges indi-
cated that in 1993-94 women compromised 50.8% of undergraduates but only 33.6% of
varsity athletes. Id. Jonathan Feigen and David Barron, SWC Faces Threat of Non-com-
pliance, Hous. CHRON., June 29, 1993, at 'lB. The article displays a chart that shows just
how far most universities are from achieving proportionality. Id. The chart indicates that
at Texas Tech, 73.7% of the scholarship athletes are male while only 53.5% of the student
body is male. Id.
201. Notwithstanding the phenomenal growth of women's athletics in the 1970s, ob-
servers indicate that women's athletics plateaued in the 1980s. See Blum, supra note 27, at
30 (noting that one advocate of female athletics is concerned that the growth in women's
sports seems to be leveling off); see also Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 746
(N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d. Cir. 1993) (vacating the case because
the plaintiffs had, or were, preparing to graduate). The Cook case exemplifies the
problems that may arise when a new sport emerges. Id. Women's ice hockey is a fairly
new phenomenon and is played at only 16 universities. Id. A difficult question arises here:
When has a sport become popular enough to justify creating a varsity team? Id. at 747.
202. In Cook, the university argued that if they spent money to set up a women's
hockey team, they might not have anyone to compete against. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 747.
The court refuted this assertion by showing the presence of other women's intercollegiate
hockey teams in the area. Id.; Ed Sherman, Women's Profit is Men's Loss, Cmi. TRIB.,
Apr. 30, 1993, at D3. The University of Michigan, in response to criticism over the elimina-
tion of its men's gymnastics team, stated that a contributing factor in the decision was that
"a dwindling number of Michigan high schools sponsor the sport." Id.; Anderson, supra
note 7, at 94-95. The article discusses the need for cost containment at many schools. Id.
at 94. The author notes that schools must attempt to comply with gender equity while
cutting rather than expanding their athletic programs. Id.
203. See supra notes 135-36, 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing the court's re-
jection of the argument that rapid expansion in the 1970s should be considered in assessing
the second benchmark); see also Anderson, supra note 7, at 85 (noting that no school
involved in litigation has carried it burden of proof on the second benchmark).
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the Policy Interpretation demands a continuing practice of expansion, not
simply one rapid expansion that is satisfactory for the next twenty
years.2" As the First Circuit noted in Cohen, the recent increase in Title
IX suits indicates that universities are not likely to expand their athletic
programs.205
Additionally, courts deciding these cases often mention that Title IX
does not demand that schools pour ever-increasing sums of money into
their athletic programs.20 6 To date, however, no court has explained how
a school can show a history of expansion without huge expenditures. 20 7 It
is logically inconsistent for courts to require universities to satisfy bench-
mark number two, by showing a continuing practice of expansion, but
then claim that Title IX does not require a university to continually in-
crease athletic department funding.208 In light of this reading of the Pol-
icy Interpretation, most universities will fail the second benchmark.20 9
Similarly, critics, and even some courts, contend that benchmark
number three is no test at all-at least not when a university has elimi-
nated an active team.210 For instance, it is difficult to imagine a court
denying that women who have fought lengthy legal battles for their
team's existence, continue to practice out of the trunk of the coach's car,
and continue to play an active club schedule, have had their interests fully
and effectively accommodated. 211 The.only time courts will have to grap-
ple with benchmark number three will be when a small group of athletes
sues for the creation of a new team.212 In reality, the Policy Interpreta-
204. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
205. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that "the recent
boom in Title IX suits suggests that, in an era of fiscal austerity, few universities are prone
to expand athletic opportunities").
206. Id. at 898-99 n.15.
207. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 (exemplifying the court's irresponsiveness to the ques-
tion of how a university can show a continuing practice of expansion without pouring ever-
increasing sums of money into their athletic program).
208. Id. The only alternative to expenditures that the court offers to comply with
benchmark one is a cut in programs. Id. Common sense indicates that cutting programs is
not a way to meet the second benchmark which requires a continued practice of expansion.
Id. Therefore, the three benchmarks appear to work against one another at times. See id.
209. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898.
210. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832 (commenting that the third benchmark is not an issue
when plaintiffs seek only to halt the elimination of their team).
211. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 581 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d
332 (3d Cir. 1993). The court pointed out that Kofie Montgomery, an instructor and ex-
coach of the women's field hockey team, now keeps the field hockey uniforms in the trunk
of her car because the university eliminated storage space. Id.
212. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832. The court stated that full and effective accommodation
of interests may become a complicated issue when a group of people ask the university to
create a "neoteric team or upgrade the status of a club team." Id. n.11 (quoting Cohen,
19951
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tion's three-benchmark test has proven to be almost outcome determina-
tive. As soon as a court begins discussing it in the context of an
eliminated female team, there is little doubt which side will prevail.213
2. The Effects of Compliance by Subtraction
While female teams consistently win Title IX challenges in court, male
athletes have not been successful in their litigation.214 Both the Kelley
and Gonyo courts refused to circumvent Title IX even though they ex-
pressed a sense of compassion for the eliminated men's teams.21 5 The
courts have decided not to reinstate male teams because male athletes
have not been denied the benefits of athletic programs.21 6 This result is
problematic because, as the Gonyo court noted, many of these men chose
to attend their university because of a promise of a four year commitment
to their respective team.217 Thus, these men lost the opportunity to par-
ticipate in intercollegiate athletics 21 8 simply because the university's ath-
991 F.2d at 904). Such complications are unlikely where the plaintiffs only seek reinstate-
ment of an existing team. Id. at 832. See also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904 (stating that "there is
unlikely to be any comparably turbid question as to interest and ability where, as here,
plaintiffs are seeking merely to forestall the internment of healthy varsity teams"); Carl
Redman, Gender Equity Causing Major Concern For LSU, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 10, 1994,
at 1D. In early 1994, three female LSU students sued the university to start a women's
varsity soccer program in the Fall of 1994. Id. Cf Cook v. Colgate, 802 F. Supp. 737, 747-
48 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that Colgate argued that it should not have to create a wo-
men's hockey team because there was insufficient student interest), vacated as moot, 992
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
213. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that all but one of 646 colleges surveyed fall
far short of meeting substantial proportionality, therefore, benchmark one is no test at all);
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (admitting that few universities in this era can show a history or
continuing practice of expansion); see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832 (supporting the propo-
sition that benchmark three rarely matters).
214. See generally Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 243-44
(C.D. Ill. 1993) (granting no relief to the eliminated men's swim team), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265
(7th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp.
989, 995-96 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (holding that schools may eliminate male teams without vio-
lating Title IX if doing so moves the athletic program closer to compliance).
215. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 244. The court stated that the "[p]laintiffs' case has
emotional appeal because it graphically demonstrates the inherent unfairness of decisions
which classify and isolate one gender for burdens that the other gender is not required to
bear." Id.
216. See Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 996 (recognizing that male athletes at Drake University
have no meritorious claim that their interests and abilities are not being effectively
accommodated).
217. Id. at 992. The Gonyo plaintiffs responded to the coach's recruitment efforts and
enrolled at Drake University both to get an education and to participate in intercollegiate
wrestling. Id.
218. For commentary on the importance of playing on a collegiate team, see Greg
Garber, Female Athletes Sue UB; Gymnastics Canceled at Bridgeport, HARTFORD COU-
RANT, Sept. 1, 1994, at Al (explaining the dismay one female athlete felt when her team
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letic program was not substantially proportionate to the school's
undergraduate population.219 While courts do not admit that cutting
male programs is the only manner in which a university can comply with
Title IX,22 ° they have accepted the possibility of compliance by subtrac-
tion and downgrading.221 The theory of compliance by subtraction raises
concerns, despite many commentator's support for the theory.222 While
it is true that elimination of men's teams moves an institution closer to
gender equity,223 such cuts have major effects on both athletes and inter-
collegiate sports.224
The rash of eliminations of men's teams225 makes it difficult for male
athletes in sports other than football and basketball to choose a university
at which to play.226 In the past, a swimmer or gymnast from Michigan
likely would attend college in his home state, however, he must now be
wary if schools in the same athletic conference are eliminating their teams
was eliminated); see also Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 581 (W.D. Pa.)
(noting a statement made by one of the plaintiffs that she "would not have gone to IUP if
she had known that the gymnastics team was to be cut"), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
219. See Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 992-93, 996 (discussing Drake University's athletic and
undergraduate populations).
220. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (reiterating that a
university may stay in compliance by meeting any one of the three benchmarks).
221. See Kelley v Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 244 (C.D. Ill.
1993) (ruling that a university may meet the first benchmark by eliminating men's teams),
aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 n.11 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that a university may bring itself into
Title IX compliance by subtraction and downgrading the over represented gender); see
also Knight, supra note 197, at C4 (commenting that coaches of men's teams are concerned
about the concept of substantial proportionality).
222. Garber, supra note 218, at A10 (expressing the consensus opinion about compli-
ance by subtraction by indicating that universities can only eliminate men's teams and can-
not touch the women's teams).
223. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 242 (finding that the elimination of the men's swimming
team did not violate Title IX because it brought the university closer to compliance); see
also Sherman, supra note 194, at C1 (commenting that to accommodate gender equity,
many non-revenue men's sports will disappear).
224. See Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (showing the problems some people have with
gender equity). One critic is concerned that gender equity, pushed to its extreme, could
"destroy college athletics as we know it." Id. (quoting Dale Brown, LSU's head men's
basketball coach); Anderson, supra note 7, at 77 n.12 (discussing some people's view that
Title IX's impact could change college athletics); see also, Jill Sterkel, At 60-40, 'Equity'
Split is Nothing to Applaud, USA TODAY, June 12, 1992, at 10C. Jill Sterkel, head coach of
the Indiana University women's swimming team, argued that without college athletics she
never would have received her education or four Olympic gold medals. Id. However, the
elimination of men's teams deprives the male athletes of the same basic educational oppor-
tunity about which Ms. Sterkel speaks so highly. Id.
225. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (discussing recently eliminated
men's teams).
226. See Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (noting that football and basketball are impor-
tant because these two sports enable a university further assist women's athletics).
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
because that may signal an impending elimination at the athlete's home
university.227 A lack of competition in secondary sports such as golf, ten-
nis, and gymnastics may result within a few years.228 The athletes who
participate in these sports may choose to attend the schools with the most
prominent golf, tennis, and gymnastics programs, creating a dearth of tal-
ent and opportunity at other schools.22 9 Taken to its extreme, two possi-
ble results may occur. First, the effort to achieve gender equity could
cause regionalization of men's sports within the NCAA,23° which would
227. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240 (showing that the University of Illinois eliminated its
men's swimming and diving teams); see Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (commenting on
further elimination); Ed Sherman, Women's Profit is Men's Loss, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1993,
at C3 (noting that Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona State have, or within the next year
will have, eliminated their men's gymnastics teams). Swimmers will forego the University
of Illinois and other Big Ten universities, where swimming teams have been eliminated,
and enroll at Stanford University, where the swim team is very successful and has less
chance of being cut. See also David Barron, Alvin CC Decision has Mixed Reviews, Hous.
CHRON., June 29, 1993, at 2B (quoting one athlete on the eliminated men's basketball team
that if he had known the school would eliminate the team, he would have gone to college
elsewhere). But cf Bonnie DeSimone, Show of Hands Saves NCAA Men's Gymnastics,
PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), Jan. 11, 1995, at 1-D, 9-D (noting that even perennial gym-
nastics powerhouse UCLA has dropped its gymnastics program from varsity to club
status).
228. See Bill Briggs, No Fair Play in College Sports: Ban on Sex Bias Ignored, DENV.
POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at 1A, 12A (explaining that some coaches believe equity will force
colleges to drop all men's varsity sports except football and basketball, which will lead to a
great decline in competition in other sports); Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (commenting
that Joe Dean, Louisiana State University athletic director, would, if pushed to the limit,
retain men's football, basketball, baseball, and track and eleven women's sports to comply
with gender equity); Anderson, supra note 7, at 95 (noting that if LSU did limit its men's
programs to those sports, the school would fall below the NCAA's minimum requirement
for Division I membership); see also DeSimone, supra note 227, at 1-D, 9-D. The article
refers to men's gymnastics as the "spotted owl of collegiate sports" in that it is almost
extinct. Id. at 9-D. Only 33 schools nationwide offer the sport, seven below the NCAA
limit for sanctioned national championships. Id. The article also acknowledges that other
dwindling men's sports such as swimming and wrestling, have asked the DED for help in
saving their sports by altering Title IX. Id
229. See Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (commenting that LSU no longer participates
in men's gymnastics or wrestling). In addition, Oregon State has dropped men's track and
the University of Oregon has eliminated baseball. Id. Other casualties in the push to fund
women's sports include swimming, gymnastics, and wrestling. Id.
230. Sherman, supra note 227, at C3 (commenting on University of Michigan President
James Duderstadt's proposal that regionalization, which saves money in travel and other
costs, is one way to achieve gender equity without taking financial resources away from the
men's teams). The University of Maryland has adopted a tiered system for its athletic
program. Anderson, supra note 7, at 100. In 1991, Maryland's 23 sports were divided into
four tiers. Id. Each tier competes on a different level and receives different assistance; for
example, tier one, which includes men's football and men's and women's basketball, com-
petes on the national level, and receive 80% of the school's scholarships, while tier four,
which includes golf, tennis, and gymnastics compete, locally and receive no scholarship aid.
Id. See Maisel, supra note 40, at 11B (commenting that cost-cutting measures will hurt
men's teams). In light of these cost-cutting measures, schools are deciding to sponsor only
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destroy the competitive balance that the NCAA seeks to achieve.23' Sec-
ond, universities may choose to eliminate all but three or four male sports
to comply with Title IX.
23 2
C. Proposed Solutions to Title IX Issues
1. Congressional Action
In 1974, Senator John Tower made a proposal which, if adopted, would
have avoided many of the problems universities currently face in attempt-
ing to comply with Title IX. Senator Tower proposed that Title IX not
apply to athletics at all.233 While Senator Tower later modified this pro-
posal to exclude only revenue-producing sports,234 he was not the only
person in Congress to propose athletic exclusions.235 Between 1972 and
1976, at least six proposed amendments to Title IX either totally excluded
athletics from the scope of Title IX or provided an exception for revenue-
producing sports.2 36 None of these amendments gained great support in
Congress, and now, twenty years later, Title IX is causing difficulty for
colleges and universities across the country.2 37 Recently, Congress has
the male sports that reflect the interest of athletes in that university's state. See Sherman,
supra note 227, at C3.
231. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 496-97 (commenting on the NCAA's
stated purposes); see also Sherman, supra note 227, at C3. Regionalization is an alterna-
tive method of cost-cutting. Id. Under this plan each school would follow the example of
Maryland, and determine the level at which they wanted to compete in each sport; the
national level or the less-expensive, regional level. Id. Regionalization is not likely to
succeed, however, because non-revenue coaches fear that their sports would be relegated
to "secondary status." Id.
232. Redman, supra note 212, at 7D. Even if LSU reduces its men's program to four
teams, the school still might not be in compliance with Title IX. Id
233. See 120 CONG. REc. 15,322-23 (1974) (noting Senator Tower's proposal).
234. Id. (exempting any "intercollegiate athletic [activity] to the extent that such activ-
ity does or may provide gross receipts or donations to the institution necessary to support
that activity"); see Knight, supra note 197, at C4 (noting that Congress and federal authori-
ties previously had discussed and rejected arguments for excluding sports).
235. See Krakora, supra note 6, at 224 n.14 (discussing a variety of congressional pro-
posals concerning Title IX); see Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) (noting a
proposal to exclude the revenues a particular sport produced to the extent the revenues are
used to fund that sport).
236. Krakora, supra note 6, at 224 n.14.
237. See Ed Sherman, Equity May Deflate Football, CHI. TRw., Feb. 21, 1993, at Sports
15. This article makes it clear that many experts in athletics do not understand gender
equity, let alone know how to deal with it. See id. One coach, when asked what occurred
in a 90 minute meeting said, "[w]ell, I know they talked about gender equity, but I still
have no idea what it is." Id. See Blum, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that massive violations
of Title IX are taking place); Duncan, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting one commentator as
stating, "These kind of changes are not easy to effect").
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received requests to hold hearings on Title IX.238 This call for hearings
has been met with opposition from many people who think that Title IX
has just begun to serve its purpose of eliminating gender discrimination in
college athletics and should be left untouched.239 On May 9, 1995, a sub-
committee of Congress' Economic and Educational Opportunities Com-
mittee conducted a one-day hearing on Title IX.2 40 Although debate
surrounding the hearing was heated, one representative noted that she
was "very confident the Congress is not going to mess with Title IX after
twenty-some years.",
241
2. Adopt Title VII's Burden-Shifting Approach
Another alternative to help solve the Title IX dilemma is for courts to
apply Title VII's burden-shifting analysis to Title IX actions.242 Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to eliminate discrimination
in employment.243 Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shift-
ing approach, 2" courts evaluate Title VII disparate treatment claims
under a three-step analysis.245 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
238. Knight, supra note 197, at C1. The 7,000 member American Football Coaches
Association (AFCA) has requested the new Republican controlled Congress to hold hear-
ings on Title IX. Id. AFCA claims that courts have not interpreted the Act the way Con-
gress originally intended. Id.
239. Id. at C4. Groups such as the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and the Women's
Sports Foundation oppose holding congressional hearings on Title IX. Id. at C1, C4.
These groups feel that Congress should not alter the law. Id
240. See Harry Blauvelt, Title IX Levels Playing Field For Women, USA TODAY, May
9, 1995, at 1A, 2A.
241. Harry Blauvelt, Football Says it's Special, USA TODAY, May 9, 1995, at 2A (quot-
ing Representative Patsy Mink, a Democrat from Hawaii).
242. For arguments in favor of applying a Title VII analysis in Title IX cases other than
athletics, see Elizabeth J. Gant, Comment, Applying Title VII "Hostile Work Environment"
Analysis to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972-An Avenue of Relief for Vic-
tims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 DicK. L. REv. 489 (1994);
Kimberly A. Mango, Comment, Students Versus Professors: Combating Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REV. 355 (1991). For
discussion of Title VII in an athletic context, see Beck, supra note 7, at 241. Title VII
served as a basis for one Title IX decision rendered by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York, but on appeal the case was dismissed as moot, and the
concept has not been revisited. See Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 743-51
(N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
243. See Gant, supra note 242, at 499 (describing cases decided under Title VII).
244. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 & n.6
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Cook, 802 F.
Supp. at 743 (summarizing Title VII's three-step burden-shifting approach).
245. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252, 253 & n.6 (explaining the three-step burden-shifting
method employed in Title VII cases); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (explaining the
same).
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facie case of discrimination.246 If successful, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to show some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its behav-
ior. 47 Once the defendant satisfies this step, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff, who, to prevail, must show that the defendant's reasons are
merely pretextual.248
A court in applying Title VII's burden-shifting analysis to Title IX
claims, would be required to modify the current Title VII approach
slightly.249 To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff first would estab-
lish that the athletic department in question is subject to Title IX, that
they are a member of the class that Title IX seeks to protect, and finally,
that the university has not satisfied the three-benchmark test.25° If the
plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden would shift to the
university to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the elimi-
nation of the team.2 5' If the university offers such a reason, the plaintiff,
to prevail, would have to demonstrate that the defendant's proffered rea-
sons are merely pretextual 52
In Cook v. Colgate ,253 after the plaintiffs established their prima facie
case,2 54 Colgate University introduced evidence of a lack of players, lack
of local competition, and budgetary concerns as a few of its legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting the women's hockey team
246. McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802. To make out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under Title VII, plaintiffs must show they are members of a protected class, that they
applied and were qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, that
they were rejected, and finally, that the employer continued to seek applicants for the job.
Id. The Court added that the standard is flexible and the proof required may vary depend-
ing on the facts of the case. Id. at 802 n.13.
247. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
248. Id. (elaborating further on the burden-shifting process).
249. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 743 (demonstrating how a Title IX claim would be ana-
lyzed under Title VII). The Title VII burden-shifting approach has been adopted and
slightly modified in other situations as well. For example, in deciding claims of employ-
ment retaliation, most courts utilize the Title VII approach. See Love v. RE/MAX of
Amer. Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984) (utilizing the Title VII approach in a claim of
retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Mesnick v. General Elec., 950 F.2d 816
(1st Cir. 1991) (using the burden shifting method in an Age Discrimination retaliation
case).
250. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 743. It is important to note that when using the modi-
fied Title VII analysis, the establishment of a prima facie case amounts to the same analysis
presently used in Title IX cases. See id.
251. See id. (applying the Burdine burden-shifting method).
252. See id. at 743-44.
253. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
254. Id. at 744. The court noted that there was no question that Colgate's athletic pro-
gram was subject to Title IX, and that the female plaintiffs were in the class that Title IX
seeks to protect. Id. Additionally, the plaintiffs showed that their interests and abilities
were not being met through the club ice hockey team. Id. The plaintiffs therefore demon-
strated a prima facie case. Id. at 745
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to varsity status.255 The district court accepted the plaintiff's rebuttal of
five of Colgate's six nondiscriminatory reasons,256 and held that because
budgetary concerns alone are not a legitimate reason, Colgate's legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reasons for its failure to promote the team to
varsity status were pretextual.257 Thus, the court held that the school vio-
lated Title IX.258 If the plaintiffs had failed to rebut Colgate's proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons, the court may have determined that Colgate
did not violate Title IX.259 For instance, if the plaintiffs had not shown
that sixteen other women's intercollegiate ice hockey teams existed in the
same geographic region, the court may not have forced Colgate to up-
grade the team to varsity status. This is so because a lack of competition
likely would constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not
upgrading.260
255. See id. at 746-51. Colgate introduced six nondiscriminatory reasons for not elevat-
ing the women's ice hockey team from club to varsity status. The reasons were: (1) wo-
men's ice hockey rarely is played on the secondary level; (2) the NCAA does not sponsor a
women's championship in ice hockey; (3) women's ice hockey is played at only 15 colleges
in the East; (4) lack of student interest; (5) lack of ability; and (6) hockey is too expensive
to fund. Id.
256. See id. at 746-49. The one reason that was not rebutted by the plaintiff was Col-
gate's budget argument. Id. at 749-50. But see infra note 288 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the fact that budget concerns alone are not a sufficient non-discriminatory reason).
257. Cook, 802 F. Supp at 750; see also Vargyus, supra note 72, at 33 (noting that fund-
ing constraints are not a defense to Title IX suits).
258. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 751 (directing Colgate to grant varsity status to the women's
hockey team).
259. Id. at 746-51. The rebuttal of the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons proceeded
in the following manner. An expert witness rebutted the contention that women's ice
hockey rarely is played on the secondary level by testifying that there are between 175 and
200 women's hockey teams nationally. Id. at 746. The idea that the NCAA does not spon-
sor a national championship was rebutted by the fact that the East Coast Athletic Confer-
ence, of which Colgate is a member, offers a championship. Id. The court also noted that
16 of the most prestigious universities in the world maintain women's ice hockey teams,
thus allowing the Colgate women to play a 32-game schedule. Id. at 747. The court dis-
missed Colgate's argument that there was a lack of student interest by stating that the
players persistence in applying for varsity status four times and finally commencing legal
action shows sufficient student interest. Id. at 748. Rejecting Colgate's argument regard-
ing a lack of ability, the court asked how the university expected an underfunded, under-
privileged team, that had to pay twenty-five cents per mile to use a school van, to be as
successful as a varsity squad. Id. Finally, Colgate claimed that budget problems kept it
from elevating the team to varsity status. Id. at 749. The court accepted this as a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason, but noted that "financial concerns alone cannot justify
gender discrimination." Id. at 750 (quoting Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530
(E.D. Pa. 1987)). The court held that the plaintiffs had effectively rebutted Colgate's non-
discriminatory reasons and ordered the school to grant varsity status to the hockey team.
Id. at 751.
260. See id. The court did not speak to this issue because the plaintiffs rebutted all of
Colgate's proffered reasons. Id.
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3. The Exclusion of Football
Most universities are dependent on the men's football and basketball
teams to produce revenue for their sports programs.26' One major prob-
lem for universities attempting to comply with Title IX is that a college
football team consists of eighty-five scholarship athletes and numerous
non-scholarship players.262  No female team requires an equivalent
number of athletes,263 making football unique in both the number of
players participating and the amount of revenue it generates.26 In light
of this, when a university is faced with difficult budget decisions, and must
eliminate athletic teams, the school will not eliminate the only two sports
that generate a significant amount of money; yet, it cannot eliminate fe-
male teams without subjecting itself to a Title IX suit.265 In essence, uni-
261. For a factual basis supporting the proposition that men's football and basketball
are the only revenue generating sports at most schools, see Redman, supra note 212, at 7D.
The article notes that LSU's athletic program accumulated costs of $15.4 million for the
1993-94 fiscal year and generated $15.9 million in revenues. Id. Of the $15.9 million, the
football program generated $7.9 million and the men's basketball program generated $2.6
million. Id. The other 16 varsity sports accounted for the remaining $4.9 million. Id. But
see Claire Smith, Concerns are Voiced on Effects of Title IX, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 3,
1995, at B19 (noting that only 65 college football programs are profitable).
262. Johnson, supra note 7, at 586 n.201 (commenting that the average size of a Divi-
sion I-A football team is 118 players); see id. at 586 n.203 (showing that for the 1994-95
school year, the number of football scholarships will be reduced to 85 per team). In re-
sponse to the difficulty of meeting the first benchmark, some commentators have proposed
examining Title IX compliance cases on a sport-specific basis. See Policy Interpretation, 44
Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,422 (1979). Under this approach, the law would obligate universities
to provide equal opportunity within each sport that is offered to both genders. Id. A
men's basketball team and a women's basketball team at the same school would receive
equal opportunities and benefits. Id. HEW refuted this idea in the Policy Interpretation.
Id. HEW feared that the absence of a requirement for identical teams would create une-
qual opportunities by allowing universities to focus funding on male sports, such as foot-
ball, that have no female counterpart. Id.
263. Ken Stephens, Coaches Fear Title IX Lawsuits May Prove Damaging for Football,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 10, 1995, at 9B (noting that football will be the primary
target in the search for gender equity because it has far more participants than any other
sport); see Anderson, supra note 7, at 76-77 (noting that on average football consumes
over 50% of a school's athletic budget); Johnson, supra note 7, at 586 n.201 (noting that the
largest women's sport is crew, which carries 29 members per team); see also Feigen, supra
note 191, at 2C (stating that the large number of football players "virtually preclude[s]
universities from having a ratio of male to female athletes proportionate to the general
student body"); Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (quoting one commentator as saying that
"[a]s long as you have 85 football players (on scholarship) plus the walk-ons.... football is
going to throw the numbers out of proportion"). LSU Chancellor William "Bud" Davis,
added that 15 females per women's team requires six or seven women's sports simply to
offset the football numbers. Id
264. See Stephens, supra note 263, at 9B (noting that football should be given defer-
ence because there are places where it generates 90% of the budget).
265. E.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237,243-45 (C.D. Ill.
1993) (showing that the university did not eliminate the men's football or basketball
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versities are left with only one option, to eliminate smaller male sports
such as wrestling, gymnastics, or golf.
2 66
To remedy this problem, one solution, referred to as the three-sex ap-
proach, has surfaced, in which football would be considered a separate
entity for Title IX purposes.267 Under this approach, courts would ex-
clude football from consideration under the three-benchmark test,
thereby eliminating the problem caused by the size of a football team.
268
Critics assert that this approach would solve many of the problems uni-
versities face under Title IX.2 69 Because the football team is often the
cause of gender disparity,27° critics contend that by excluding it, most uni-
versities would come into compliance with the substantial proportionality
benchmark, and thus, into compliance with Title IX.
27 1
teams), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Anderson,
supra note 7, at 93 (noting that Cal State-Fullerton, citing budget and gender equity con-
cerns, discontinued its football program for at least the 1994-95 season). But cf Barron,
supra note 227, at B1 (noting that Alvin Community College eliminated its successful
men's basketball team to make room for women's softball).
266. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240 (showing that the University of Illinois eliminated
men's swimming and men's and women's diving); see also Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F.
Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (eliminating men's wrestling); supra notes 227-32 and accom-
panying text (noting the variety of small sports that have been dropped at various universi-
ties in order to expand women's sports).
267. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 96-97 (discussing that excluding football would
take that sport outside of gender calculations for Title IX purposes). The article notes that
at various times, Congressmen and legal commentators have viewed Title IX's regulations
as exempting revenue producing sports. Id. at 96. The Policy Interpretation deals with the
exemption proposal by recognizing that " 'the unique size and cost of football programs
have been taken into account in developing this Policy Interpretation.' " Id. at 96 n.160
(quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 419 (1979)).
268. For an example of this, see Blair v. Washington State University, 740 P.2d 1379,
1381-84 (Wash. 1987). The trial court in Blair excluded football before examining Title IX
compliance at Washington State University. Id This exclusion of football was reversed at
the appellate level. Id.
269. See Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (noting LSU Chancellor Davis' comments on
the gender equity problems caused by football). But cf. Briggs, supra note 228, at 12A
(pointing out that the University of Denver has no football team, but still is struggling to
comply with Title IX).
270. See Sherman, supra note 194, at C19 (explaining that "[football] throws off all the
numbers.... It's like tossing an elephant on the scale"); see also Blauvelt, supra note 241,
at 2A (noting that college football is trying to persuade Congress that it should be given
special relief from Title IX); see Anderson, supra note 7, at 96-97 (discussing the exclusion
of football and other revenue producing sports). But cf. Maisel, supra note 40, at 11B
(reiterating that in a compliance determination at a federally funded institution, federal
law mandates the inclusion of football, even though there is no comparable female sport).
271. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993). The First Circuit
stated that the substantial proportionality benchmark provides universities with a "safe
harbor." Id. The court added that by meeting the first benchmark, institutions can remain
on the "sunny side" of Title IX. Id. at 898.
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One trial court adopted the concept of football exclusion when initially
faced with a Title IX case.272 In Blair v. Washington State University,273
the trial court held that because football is unique from other college
sports,271 it should be excluded from the Title IX calculations.275 The
court explained that football is more like a business than a sport and,
therefore, it should not be included in a gender equity analysis.276 The
appellate court in Blair reversed, ruling that the trial court had abused its
discretion in excluding football, and holding that excluding football
would only perpetuate the discrimination Title IX seeks to remedy.277
4. Reduce the Size and Cost of the Football Team
Another proposed solution to Title IX is to reduce both the number of
football players participating, and the cost of operating a college football
team.278 Many Division I-A schools carry 100 or more football players; a
number criticized as too large.279 The argument in favor of cutting the
number of football players seemingly is strengthened by the fact that the
National Football League, which plays six to eight more games per season
than a college team, allows only forty-seven players per team.280 This
272. Blair, 740 P.2d at 1379.
273. Id.
274. Knight, supra note 197, at C4 (noting the ways in which football is unique from
any other college sport).
275. See Blair, 740 P.2d at 1383. The court pointed to factors such as the number of
participants, scholarships, and coaches; and the amount of equipment, facilities, special
publicity, staffing, and security needed to handle the large number of participants. Id. The
Policy Interpretation does make exceptions for football, but they do not apply to the effec-
tive accommodation assessment. Anderson, supra note 7, at 97.
276. Id.; see also Koch, supra note 7, at 10-11 (discussing intercollegiate athletics as an
industry and noting the large effect that economic conditions have on amateur athletics).
277. See Blair, 740 P.2d at 1382-83; cf. Sherman, supra note 194, at C1 (commenting
that excluding football is not a simple answer to Title IX because even if you took away 90
scholarships for football at every Big 10 school, the men still receive, on average, 20 more
athletic opportunities).
278. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 586-87 (suggesting some possible cost cutting meas-
ures within the football program); see also Feigen, supra note 191, at 2C. Donna Lopiano,
director of the Women's Sports Foundation and former women's athletic director at the
University of Texas alleges waste in every Division I football budget. Id. Some of the
excesses that she says "border[ ] on ludicrous" include country club memberships for the
coaches, excessive middle management, and having the team stay in hotels the night before
home football games. Id. Lopiano concluded by saying: "Football is not the golden goose.
It's a fat goose eating food that could nourish more opportunities for women." Id.
279. See Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (noting that the size of a Division I-A football
team in 1994 was 85 scholarship players, plus a number of walk-ons, which often brought
the total number of players above 100); Sherman, supra note 194, at C19 (noting that some
schools like Nebraska and Michigan State currently carry more than 140 players);
280. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 61. Critics argue, however, that college football needs
that many scholarships to remain competitive and to maintain its public appeal. Id. The
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argument has particular merit if one considers what could become of the
twenty or so extra athletic slots produced by the reduction of the football
team.281 Unfortunately, because football coaches often are influential at
their respective universities, 282 it is unlikely that any large reduction in
football scholarships will come soon.
283
Further, supporters of large football programs argue that the popular-
ity of college football, enables universities to do more for women's
sports.284 At many universities, football is the sport that earns the most
money and gives the school the greatest publicity.285 Therefore, adminis-
trators often are not receptive to the idea of reducing the size of the foot-
ball program for fear that its popularity will diminish.286
comparisons to the NFL appear weaker when one considers that if an NFL player is hurt
during the season, the team can place that player on injured reserve and replace him on the
roster. See Rick Telander, A Week With the Dallas Cowboys: Moments of Low Humor and
High Purpose, Ending, as Usual, With a Win, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 12, 1994, at 28
(illustrating the number of players who get hurt and are out on injured reserve in a given
week in the National Football League).
281. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 61 (asserting that cuts in college football would help
fund women's and non-revenue sports that presently get lost in the shuffle).
282. Maisel, supra note 40, at 11B (noting that while football coaches constitute only
one part of the athletic program, it is a very large part); see Sherman, supra note 227, at C1
(comparing the benefits received by the head football coach, as opposed to the men's gym-
nastics coach at the University of Michigan).
283. Sherman, supra note 194, at C19 (pointing out that football and other men's reve-
nue producing sports are not currently in danger of elimination, although a cap may be put
on the number of players per team). But cf Knight, supra note 197, at C4. The article
describes concerns expressed by some college football coaches that football programs will
be adversely affected by Title IX and should, therefore, be exempt from its requirements.
Id. For example, at Shippensburg University, the football coach cut the size of his team
from 110 to 80 because of Title IX. Id.
284. See Redman, supra note 212, at 7D (detailing LSU athletic director Joe Dean's
opinion that the revenue generated by the football program, allows women's sports to
compete at current levels).
285. See Bennett, supra note 191, at D1. Joe Dean summarized his school this way:
"I've got 80,000 seats in my stadium. I'm going to play football at LSU, and I'm going to
play it big." Id. See also Maisel, supra note 40, at 11B. Paul "Bear" Bryant, one of the
most respected football coaches of all time, stated in his autobiography: "The mystery to
me is why they always want to cut the football budget.... Football pays the freight at most
schools.... Why would you try to shut down the counter that's keeping you in business?"
Id. But cf. Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform Of Intercollegiate Ath-
letics, 3 MARO. SPORTS L.J. 123, 154 (1993) (pointing out one commentator who shows
convincingly that the bulk of athletic programs at large universities are not profitable).
286. Feigen, supra note 191, at 2C. The sentiment toward gender equity among sup-
porters of college football is evidenced by a statement a former Notre Dame athletic ad-
ministrator made that he was "dismayed at the publicity and apparent support that militant
women have received by their irrational attack on football as their bugaboo." Id. Maisel,
supra note 40, at 1B (quoting Georgia football coach Ray Goff's feelings on gender equity
as: "You don't want to know what I really think"). But see Rachel Shuster, Football
Equality Can Coexist, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 1993, at 2C (commenting that insecure admin-
istrators feel that football is at the "cross hairs of female fanatics gunning for equal every-
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III. SOLVING TITLE IX's PROBLEMS
A. Apply Title VII
Adaptation of the Title VII burden-shifting approach is a reasonable
solution to Title IX's shortcomings.28 7 By incorporating Haffer's com-
mand that financial concerns alone are insufficient to justify discrimina-
tion, Title VII provides female athletes with the same protection that
Title IX presently affords.2"8 While remaining a strong vehicle to remedy
discrimination, the Title VII approach would, in extraordinary circum-
stances, allow a court to uphold the elimination of a women's team with-
out finding a Title IX violation.289 The argument for using Title VII is
furthered by analogizing between students and athletes who fall under
the guise of Title IX and employees who are protected by Title VII.
290
Employees must arrive for work daily and perform their respective
jobs.291 Similarly, students and athletes must arrive for school and prac-
tice daily and do the assignments their coaches and professors give
them.2 92 In light of the additional equity the Title VII approach affords,
and the fact that there is very little difference between the elimination of
an employee and the elimination of an athletic team, courts should apply
similar tests in both scenarios.293
thing," when in fact, the idea of football being destroyed is wholly irrational); see supra
note 265 (discussing Cal State-Fullerton's elimination of football).
287. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text (discussing how the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York applied Title VII to a Title IX case).
For a demonstration of other situations where Title VII has been applied to Title IX cases
see Gant, supra note 242, at 506 (commenting that courts have expressed a willingness to
apply Title VII to sexual harassment cases brought under Title IX).
288. See Cook v. Colgate, 802 F. Supp. 737, 750 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993). The university had to show more than budget concerns to prevail.
Id. This is important because if budget concerns alone satisfied the legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason portion of Title VII, Title VII would be an ineffective tool on which to base
Title IX decisions. Id.
289. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 750 (implying that if the university did have a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, it might not have been found in violation). This would poten-
tially allow a university to eliminate three less-popular women's teams and replace them
with two more-popular teams. This would allow more women to participate in intercollegi-
ate sports at that university, but would not expose the school to Title IX liability.
290. Gant, supra note 242, at 506. In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 975
F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993), the Fifth Circuit stated,
"[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the work environment and school environ-
ment." Id. See Gant, supra note 242, at 506 (recognizing that a student's position in the
hierarchy of a school is structurally similar to an employee's business position).
291. See Gant, supra note 242, at 507-09 (commenting on the necessity of attending
both work and school).
292. See id. This is particularly true in grade school, but it also applies to college be-
cause there is "substantial compulsion associated with schooling." Id. at 509.
293. Id. at 517.
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B. Eliminate the Flaw in the Second Benchmark
Another possible way to resolve compliance problems would be for the
judiciary to reevaluate the demands of the second benchmark. 294 This
benchmark requires a university to demonstrate a history and continuing
practice of expansion for the under-represented gender.295 By adhering
to the Policy Interpretation's requirement of a continued practice of
growth, courts essentially are advocating a slow, deliberate pace in the
growth of women's athletics within a university.296 If, in the 1970s, uni-
versities had anticipated that they would be required to comply with this
benchmark, logic dictates that they would have engaged in a slower, more
calculated expansion of female sports, instead of the rapid expansion that
occurred.2 97 In the 1970's, if they had begun to expand by adding a wo-
men's team every two years, today those universities would be able to
demonstrate a history and continuing practice of expansion.298 Under
the current reading of Title IX, if universities plan to add women's sports
to their athletic program, it behooves them to add new teams slowly,
thereby avoiding potential Title IX liability by satisfying the second
benchmark.299
294. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 413, 71,418 (1979); see also Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the second benchmark of the
effectively accommodating portion of the Title IX analysis).
295. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979).
296. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903 (stating that the university must adhere only to a pace
that is dictated by student interest).
297. See Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. Colo.) (noting
that Colorado State University had no women's sports at the beginning of the 1970s, but by
the end of that decade, the school sponsored eleven sports for women), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
298. To illustrate this loophole, suppose a new university were to open it doors in 1995.
Like the First Circuit did in Cohen, the illustration will refer to the new university as Oooh
U. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899. Suppose Oooh U. begins its athletic program with five men's
teams and five women's teams. Every other year, Oooh U. adds one men's and one wo-
men's team to the program, until the program contains 15 men's teams, one of which is
football, and 15 women's teams. Now, 20 years later in the year 2015, Oooh U. eliminates
five of the women's teams and the athletes file a Title IX suit. It is likely that the school,
because of the men's football team, will not meet the substantial proportionality bench-
mark, nor will the school prevail on the third benchmark, effectively accommodating the
interests and abilities of the students, because the women presumably would fight to keep
their team. See id. at 904 (asserting that by suing to keep their successful gymnastic and
volleyball teams, the women have demonstrated the necessary interest and ability). But,
in light of the second benchmark, Oooh U. does not violate Title IX, because they can
show a history and continued practice of expansion of women's sports.
299. See id. at 898-900 (showing that by meeting the second benchmark a university can
avoid a Title IX violation).
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C. New Sources for Solutions
Because courts have been reluctant to adopt any proposals, new ideas
must be posited to respond to problems stemming from Title IX compli-
ance.3° ° One potential solution may come from Congress.3° ' In Decem-
ber, 1994, twenty-two Senators sent a letter to the Education Secretary
stating their concern that Title IX is threatening the economic well-being
of universities with football programs.302 In response to the Senators'
letter, OCR replied that it is reviewing the way it enforces the law.303 As
part of this review, DED is revising the Title IX compliance manual.30 4
In light of the pressure DED is facing from both Congress and eliminated
men's teams, it remains to be seen if there will be significant changes in
the law.
1. Title IX: The Reason for the Rule
Assuming that courts will remain disenchanted with the idea of exclud-
ing football from the Title IX calculations, another potential solution
utilizes the reason for the rule approach. 0 5 Under this method, one be-
gins with an analysis of Title IX's purpose, asking why the law was en-
acted and what is seeks to achieve.3 6 Title IX was enacted to prevent the
discriminatory use of federal funds in educational institutions.30 7 If one
accepts the supposition that the entire cost of sponsoring an athletic pro-
gram is equivalent to the use of federal funds, then the following argu-
ment should apply to Title IX.
Every university athletic department should total each team's operat-
ing budget and subtract from that amount any revenue earned by the
individual team that year; this number would represent the team's net
300. For a commentary on what could happen if nothing is done to resolve Title IX
issues, see Bennett, supra note 191, at D-1 (suggesting that defection from the NCAA is
one possible remedy football schools may be willing to try). One athletic director com-
mented that "football schools don't need the NCAA.... If they start cutting beyond what
schools think is reasonable, they could be in trouble." Id. See Dame, supra note 191, at
Cll (noting the possible pullout of football programs from Division I-A).
301. See Knight, supra note 197, at C1 (noting that the new Republican Congress is
seen by some football coaches as a "miracle").
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. DeSimone, supra note 227, at 9-D. The compliance manual is the guide used by
Title IX investigators to determine whether a recipient is in compliance with the law. Id.
305. Portions of this section are from conversations and ideas that emerged during con-
versations with Professor Roger Hartley of The Columbus School of Law at The Catholic
University of America.
306. See Petriella, supra note 47, at 596-97 n.8 (discussing the purpose of Title IX).
307. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
1995l
Catholic University Law Review
profit or loss for the year.3"' If a particular team earns a profit, then it
has not "used" any federal money, but if it has lost money, then it has
"used" the amount lost.30 9 At the end of each year the net profits and
losses for all the men's and women's teams should be totaled. There
should be a total gross established for the men's teams, and a total gross
established for the women's teams. The totals for the men's program and
the total for the women's program should then be compared and should
be equal, because the bottom line reflects the amount of money "used"
by the university for the men's and women's athletic programs
respectively.31°
This analysis indirectly encourages many of the ideas that have been
advocated elsewhere, such as reducing the budget of a university's foot-
ball team.311 For instance, if a school chose to reduce the football budget,
other sports would be spared because the athletic department would be
better able to deal with budget cuts, thus making a more equitable situa-
tion for all athletes. This theory would continue to help female athletics,
and would afford university administrators greater freedom in their deci-
sion making.
308. See C. David Strupeck et al., Financial Management at Georgia Tech, MGMT.
Accr., Feb. 1993, at 58, 61-62. From a financial management point of view, Strupeck advo-
cates such an accounting method. Id. A two-step approach first decides what each team
earns and then decides what they spend. Id. at 59-61. Those numbers then are subtracted
to determine a bottom line and demonstrate how the funds are used. Id. Strupeck gives an
example of this type of analysis as done by the athletic department at Georgia Tech. Id. at
60.
309. Id. at 61-62.
310. A numerical example can help illuminate this idea. Suppose an athletic depart-
ment at a given university contains 10 male and 10 female varsity sports. Each of the 10
women's sports and nine of the 10 men's sports have an operating budget of $100,000. The
football team is the exception; its budget is $500,000 per year. Now suppose every wo-
men's team brings in $10,000 in revenue for the given year. Assuming such, the university
would have spent $900,000 to operate the women's sports program. Similarly, suppose all
of the men's teams raise $10,000 in revenue, but the football team earns $500,000 in reve-
nue. Under this model, the university has spent $810,000 to fund the men's programs. In
light of these numbers, the university would not be using the federal money in a discrimi-
natory manner because the women and men each spend federal funds to roughly the same
extent. Raw numbers make the system seem unfair, but when one considers that most
football programs do not break even, the numbers become much more equitable. Suppose
in the above example, the football team loses $200,000 per year. The university then would
have spent $1.1 million on men's sports and only $900,000 on women's. This would consti-
tute disparate treatment and might, after other factors are considered, violate Title IX. See
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994) (listing 10 factors that the regulations consider in assessing
equality of opportunity under the Title IX analysis).
311. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 587 n.204 (pointing out such perks in the football
budget as chartered aircraft and hotel stays on the night before a game).
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2. Creative Ways to Increase Revenue
Another approach to solving some of the Title IX issues is to be crea-
tive and look for new sources of revenue for athletic programs. For in-
stance, one alternative is to design a bonus system for schools that
attempt to come into compliance with Title IX.31 2 This bonus does not
have to be direct federal money, but instead could consist of government
grants, additional research grants, or additional financial aid for students
at complying institutions.313 Another option is for schools to contract
with large corporations, such as General Motors, Ford, Nike, and
Reebok, to begin a Title IX program.314 These entities would donate
money to schools' athletic programs to help fund women's athletics.315
For example, at the end of most televised college football games, a corpo-
ration presently donates one thousand dollars to each participating uni-
versity's general scholarship fund.316 The university could ask the
corporation to match the donation to the general scholarship fund with
312. For instance, the University of Iowa is experimenting with a program that they
believe will bring them into compliance with the Act. Why not reward this effort, thereby
encouraging other schools to follow suit. See Sherman, supra note 194, at C1, C19 (discuss-
ing different alternatives tried by universities to comply with Title IX). The Iowa program
relies heavily on state funding and assistance. Anderson, supra note 7, at 93. The state has
agreed to charge only in-state tuition for out-of-state athletes, and has contributed
$200,000 in direct aid to the athletic programs. Id. A problem with Iowa's program, how-
ever, is that state funding is both unreliable and not available to private institutions. Id.
(noting the unreliability of state funding by explaining that after the California State Uni-
versity system undertook a stringent gender equity scheme the state cut funding for the
school).
313. See Mark Bradley, Gender Equity is Forcing the Sexes to Take Sides, THE AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., May 22, 1993, at C1. (detailing options available to schools to help
them comply). Deborah Yow, the athletic director at the University of Maryland, who has
been involved in almost every aspect of college sports, offers some possible ideas to aid in
compliance. Id. She proposes the concept of tuition waivers or private endowment funds
for female athletics. Id. Another commentator, who happens to be Deborah Yow's sister
and the basketball coach at North Carolina, disagrees with her sister's perspective on gen-
der equity. Id.
314. See B.G. Brooks, CU Trying on New Way of Getting Uniforms, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Dec. 31, 1994, at 8B. Nike and the University of Michigan instituted a plan whereby
Nike not only agreed to outfit the athletic teams, but also helped fund a new women's
team. Id.
315. Id. Nike receives national attention when the University of Michigan wears their
clothing; it replaces the necessity of purchasing advertising. Id.; see also Koch, supra note
40, at 27-29 (explaining the importance of the mutual relationship between college football
and network television, and how the networks often are receptive to new ideas); see Dorr,
supra note 193, at 4D (noting that schools view television as the most likely source for
revenue to fund gender equity).
316. NCAA Football: Miami v. Syracuse (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1994)
(videotape on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
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an additional one thousand dollar donation to the schools "Title IX
fund," to be used in furtherance of gender equity.317
Another viable option would be to raise student fees nominally each
semester.318 This could amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars each
year, all of which could be funneled into female athletics.319 Universities
also could investigate a small increase in ticket prices for admission to
men's football and basketball games, and earmark that money directly for
women's athletics. At the University of Michigan, which plays six home
football games per season and sells over 100,000 tickets to each game,32°
this could mean an additional $300,000 - $600,000 per year for women's
athletics. Universities should attempt to utilize creative programs to
solve Title IX issues. By developing such systems, the NCAA and the
schools could encourage compliance with Title IX without eliminating
male teams.32'
IV. CONCLUSION
Title IX strives for equality and fairness for women who traditionally
have been discriminated against in education and college athletics. Title
IX has had an arduous history, and only in the past ten years has it finally
begun to eliminate gender discrimination in athletics. But the crux of
Title IX has remained unchanged since the 1979 Policy Interpretation,
while society has changed dramatically during those fifteen years. The
time has come to revisit at the Act, to see if it can be made more equita-
ble; to see if men, women and universities can all co-exist without any
athletes being deprived of the chance to participate in the wonderful ex-
perience that college athletics affords. Though Title IX is an admirable
law, and has advanced women's athletics, there is room for improvement,
room enough to allow everyone to participate.
Jeffrey P. Ferrier
317. This idea is similar to the private endowment fund proposed by one commentator.
See supra note 313 and accompanying text (noting the idea of a private endowment fund).
318. Joan O'Brien, The Unlevel Playing Field, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 4, 1994, at
Al. Utah State University, faced with compliance problems, raised $200,000 earmarked
for women's athletics, through a small increase in student fees. Id.
319. Id.
320. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 61 (noting that 100,000 people attend Michigan football
games on Saturdays in Ann Arbor).
321. Tom Witosky, Iowa Coach Gable Wrestles With Impact, USA TODAY, May 9, 1995,
at 2C. Grant Teaff, the executive director of the American College Football Coaches Asso-
ciation advocated this type of creativity when he stated "[i]ntelligent men and women can
find a way to increase female participation opportunities without eliminating male oppor-
tunities if they will look at this from a reality standpoint." Id.
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